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RIGHT OF INDEmNITORS OF CO-TORTFEASORs To CONTRIBUTION rROI EACH Oxa_-
IT mAS been stated as a general rule that one of two tortfeasors who satisfies a
joint judgment recovered against them both, cannot obtain contribution from his
co-tortfeasor.1 The reasons usually advanced for this rule are that the enforcement
of contribution would encourage the commission of torts, and that the courts will
not aid wrongdoers. Not only has doubt been cast on the validity of these reasons,
but other considerations of public policy make contribution desirable.2 Accordingly,
the rule has been riddled with exceptions and limitations by many courts and legis-
latures,3 and there is a commendable tendency to prevent its extension whenever pos-
sible.4 The Ohio court has recently rejected an opportunity to follow this tendency.
A joint judgment of $7500 and costs was obtained against A and B, two motor com-
panies, as concurrently negligent joint tortfeasors. Both A and B carried indemnity
insurance, A with the plaintiff casualty company, and B with the defendant indem-
nity company. A statute provided that the liability of a tortfeasor's indemnitor
should become absolute on the occurrence of the tort, and that a person obtaining
a final judgment against the tortfeasor, which remained unsatisfied for thirty days
after rendition, could then sue the indemnitor directly for the insurance money.5
The defendant indemnity company refused to pay the judgment creditor more than
$1000, and twenty-two days after the judgment was affirmed-but over a year after
the rendition of the original judgment-the plaintiff casualty company paid the
balance in order to prevent levy of execution on A's property. Thereafter, the
casualty company instituted suit against the indemnity company for contribution.
The court dismissed the suit, holding that contribution was unavailable because the
parties were not co-sureties.6
The basis for recovery naturally suggested by this situation was subrogation of the
plaintiff, A's indemnitor, to A's rights against others.7 But if A had satisfied the
judgment, the Ohio courts would have denied it contribution from B,8 and conse-
quently B's indemnitor.9 The plaintiff could hardly have obtained a greater right
1. Union Stock Yards Company of Omaha v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad
Company, 196 U. S. 217 (1905).
2. An excellent criticism of the rule and the reasons supposedly underlying it may be
found in Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between TortfeaSors (1932) 81 U. o PA.
L. REV. 130.
3. See Union Stock Yards Company of Omaha v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
Railroad Company, 196 U. S. 217, 224 (1905); Leilar, supra note 2, at 139-142, 144-145.
4. See Leflar, supra note 2, at 141-142.
5. Omo GEN,. CODE (Page 1926) § 9510-3, 9510-4. Many other states have statutes
which in some way make the indemnitor liable to the injured party. See V,.ce, L;sim-
aicE (2d ed. 1930) § 178; Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 20.
6. United States Casualty Company v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 129 Ohio
St. 391, 195 N. E. 850 (1935) (Williams, J., dissented).
7. An indemnitor ordinarily may be subrogated to his indemnitee's rights against others.
See VAwcE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 175.
8. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N. E. 194 (1930).
9. Even where tortfeasor A has a right to contribution from his co-tortfeasor, B, he
may not have any such right against B's indemnitor. In the absence of statute, B's indem-
nitor is usually liable only to B. VA.cE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 178. Statutes making
the indemnitor directly liable to the tortfeasee are quite numerous. Ibid. But, despite
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when placed in A's shoes through subrogation.' 0 Another possibility of recovery was
through subrogation to the judgment creditor's rights. A joint tortfeasor's surety,
when compelled under his contract to pay the loss to the injured party, has some-
times been partially subrogated to the injured party's judgment rights against the
other tortfeasor, thus obtaining contribution unavailable to his principal.'1 Accord-
ingly it has been suggested that an indemnitor who fulfills his statutory duty by
paying the injured party directly should be similarly treated.12 No compelling
reason appears why this should not be done.la But judicial precedent seems lack-
ing, and the Ohio court has explicitly denied such relief, even where the indemnitor
was also a surety on its indemnitee's appeal bond.14
The plaintiff sought to avoid these difficulties by relying on the entirely inde-
pendent15 doctrine of contribution, operating directly between the indemnitors.
The court virtually decided the case by its supposition that contribution was avail-
such a statute, the New York court has refused to allow A's indemnitor to recover from
B's indemnitor, seemingly because A had no such right. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance
Company of New York v. Union Indemnity Company of Louisiana, 141 Misc. 792, 253
N. Y. Supp. 324 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd without op., 255 N. Y. 591, 175 N. E. 326 (1931),
noted in (1931) 16 CoRN. L. Q. 400. But see Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Mil-
waukee General Const. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 251 N. W. 491 (1933) semble; Langmald, Sub-
rogation in Suretyship and Insurance (1934) 47 HARv. 1. REv. 976, 1005.
10. This conclusion has been criticised because the reasons for the rule as between
tortfeasors have no application to their indemnitors. See Langmaid, suPra note 9, at 1007;
(1934) 32 MIcH. L. Rv. 1011. But the cases seem unanimously opposed to this argument.
Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389 (1921); Royal Indemnity Co. v.
Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N. E. 194, 75 A. L. R. 1481 (1930); Cain v. Quannah Light
& Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25, 267 Pac. 641 (1928) and see note 9, supra.
11. Kolb v. National Surety Co., 176 N. Y. 233, 68 N. E. 247 (1903); City of White
Plains v. Ellis, 113 Misc. 5, 184 N. Y. Supp. 444 (1920), aff'd 200 App. Div. 869, 192
N. Y. Supp. 920 (1922), noted in (1921) 5 Mm. L. Ray. 370; Rosenthal v. New York
Rys. Co., 109 i1isc. 210, 179 N. Y. Supp. 593 (Sup. Ct. 1919); see Smith v. Fall River
Joint Union High' School Dist., 1 Cal. (2d) 331, 334, 34 Pac. (2d) 994, 996 (1934). New
York now allows contribution between tortfeasors by statute. N. Y, Civ, Pa o. ACT
(1928) § 211a. But the same theory of subrogation to the judgment creditor's rights is
still followed. Martin v. Miller, 242 App. Div. 38, 272 N. Y. Supp. 914 (1934).
12. See United States Casualty Company v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America,
129 Ohio St. 391, 399, 195 N. E. 850, 854 (1935) (Williams, J., dissenting: "It is the
statutory obligation which is involved here and if the one insurance company which paid
more than the other to the judgment creditor stood in the shoes of any one, It was In
those of the judgment creditor"); Campbell, Non-Consensual Suretyship (1935) 45
YALE L. J. 69.
13. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 94.
14. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N. E. 194 (1930) (The
court did not discuss the effect of the statute). In accord: Smith v. Fall River joint Union
High School Dist., 1 Cal. (2d) 331, 34 Pac. (2d) 994 (1934); cf. Quatray v. Wicker, 178
La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933). Both California and Louisiana also have statutes allowing
the injured party to proceed directly against the indemnitor. GEN. LAws or CAt. (1931)
Act. 3738, § 1; LA. GEx. STAT. (2 Dart 1932) § 4248.
15. Contribution does not depend on subrogation. Camp v. Bostwick, 20 Ohio St.
337 (1870); Central Banking & Security Company v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company, 73 W. Va. 197, 80 S. E. 121 (1913) (Suggests that courts sitting at law enforce
contribution but not subrogation, and hence the concepts are not interdependent); gee
(1921) 5 Mnm-. L. Rnv. 370.
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able only if the parties were co-sureties, 16 meaning thereby that both parties must be
under a duty to satisfy the debt of the same person. But analysis shows that con-
tribution is not so limited,17 but is a flexible doctrine of equity,18 applicable in many
varying situations where it is desirable to prevent unjust enrichment. 10 Its essential
elements appear to be: (1) a class of parties, each of whom is equally subject to a
common burden, consisting of a risk, either of loss, or of failure to gain a benefit;
(2) a payment, or its equivalent, by one of the parties, relieving the others of this
risk; (3) a probability at the time of payment that the burden will fall on the class
or a member thereof, sufficient to make the payment non-officious; -0 (4) the
absence of a contract or rule of public policy prohibiting contribution.
If the plaintiff's payment in the principal case occurred more than thirty days
16. See United States Casualty Company v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 129
Ohio St. 391, 394, 195 N. E. 850, 852 (1935). Strictly speaking, the indemnitors were
of course not co-sureties. Courts have sometimes explained their enforcement of contri-
bution by calling the parties co-sureties. Vian v. Hilberg, 111 Neb. 232, 196 N. W. 153
(1923). This seems perfectly proper if the term is used only to describe the legal con-
clusion to which the court has come. But use of the term in a strict sense as an exclutive
test to determine whether contribution is available is unjustifiable. The true test Ehould
be found in the factual situation, and not in legal nomenclature.
17. The right to contribution is not limited to parties liable for the debt of another,
but is enforceable between joint principal debtors. Quintin v. Magnant, 285 Ma. 45o0, 189
N. E. 209 (1934). And it may arise from a statutory liability. Wolters v. Henningan,
114 Cal. 433, 46 Pac. 277 (1896); Aspinwall v. Sacchi, 57 N. Y. 331 (1874); Manthey v.
Schueler, 126 Minn. 87, 147 N. W. 824 (1914) ; Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113 (1866).
Nor is it necessary to contribution that the parties be under a legal duty at all. For exam-
ple, contribution is enforced between co-tenants where one has made necezzary repairs.
Fowler v. Fowler, 50 Conn. 256 (1882); between beneficiaries of a life insurance policy
who accept its benefits after one has paid the necessary premiums. Stock'well v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 140 Cal. 193, 73 Pac. 833 (1903); and between persons deriving benefit from
litigation, the costs of which have been borne by one of their number. Maney v. Cas-
serly, 134 Mich. 252, 96 N. W. 478 (1903).
18. Contribution originated in equity and was subsequently adopted by the law courts.,
Wayland v. Tucker, 4 Gratt. 267 (Va. 1848).
19. See Leflar, supra note 2, at 136; (1925) 35 YAT. L. J. 92.
20. Payment has been deemed non-officious when made under the following circum-
stances: (a) Involuntarily, as where a party's securities, wrongfully pledged along with
those of other parties by a common agent, have been sold by the pledgee: Asylum of St.
Vincent De Paul v. McGuire, 239 N. Y. 375, 146 N. E. 632 (1925). (b) Under a legal
duty, before suit: Shattuck v. Ellis, 49 Idaho 330, 288 Pac. 162 (1930); Western Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Milwaukee General Const. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 251 N. W. 491 (1933).
(c) Under a legal duty subject to a condition precedent, as where payment of an obli-
gation is made before the due date: Golsen v. Brand, 75 Ill. 148 (1374); Hotham v. Berry,
82 Kan. 412, 108 Pac. 801 (1910); Craig v. Craig, 5 Rawle 91 (Pa. 1835); see Gucken-
heimer & Bros. Co. v. Kann, 243 Pa. 75, SO, 89 Ati. 807, 803 (1914). But it has been held
that the party seeking contribution must show that the obligation would have accrued and
not been satisfied otherwise: Loftus v. Tucker, 272 Ill. App. 245 (1933); see Hotham v.
Berry, 82 Kan. 412, 414, 108 Pac. 801, 802 (1910). In such cases the right to contribution
arises on the due date. Truss v. Miller, 116 Ala. 494, 22 So. 863 (1897). (d) Voluntarily,
and under no legal pressure, where the class receives a positive benefit: Hill v. Cracker,
87 Me. 208, 32 AUt. 878 (1895); Stockwell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 140 Cal. 193, 73 Pac.
833 (1903); Maney v. Casserly, 134 Mich. 252, 96 N. W. 478 (1903). The common factor
implicit in all these situations seems to be the strong probability that one or more of the
class would sustain the burden, if the payment were not made.
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after the "final judgment" indicated by the statute, these requirements would
clearly have been met. (1) For, under the statute, the judgment creditor had a
right to immediate payment from the indemnitor upon the elapse of thirty days
from "final judgment" without payment by the judgment debtor. The indemnitors
were thus subjected to an equal risk of having to pay the same judgment to the
same person. (2) Payment by the, plaintiff relieved the defendant of this risk.
(3) The payment was non-officious because the plaintiff was under a legal duty to
pay which he could not have resisted.20 Nor is this altered by the fact that A
might have satisfied the judgment, thus relieving both indemnitors of the risk of
having to pay the judgment creditor. A surety who pays his principal's obligation
on maturity without awaiting suit, may be allowed contribution from his co-surety
without first showing that the principal would not have paid.2 1 ' (4) No contract 22
or rule of public policy required the denial of contribution. The reasoning invoked
to deny contribution between co-tortfeasors can have no application to their indem-
nitors, whose interests are opposed to the commission of torts, and who come into
court with clean hands.23 Nor can it be argued that to allow contribution between
the indemnitors is to lighten the tortfeasors' load, and thus to evade the rule against
contribution between co-tortfeasors. For the tortfeasors are held harmless in any
event under their contracts with the indemnitors.2 4
If, then, the words "final judgment" in the Ohio statute mean the judgment of the
trial court,25 the plaintiff in the instant case should have been allowed to recover.
For plaintiff did not make payment to the judgment creditor until over a year after
the trial court judgment (but twenty-two days after judgment on appeal), and
therefore, under the above construction of the statute, well beyond the elapse of the
thirty-day statutory period without the judgment debtor having made payment.
Thus, plaintiff might have been held to have paid the judgment creditor while under
a legal duty to make immediate payment, and consequently to be entitled to con-
tribution.2 6
gut if the term "final judgment" refers to the final disposition of the case on
appeal, the plaintiff's payment was made within the thirty day period, and the
21. Odlin v. Greenleaf, 3 N. H. 270 (1825); see Buckner v. Stewart, 34 Ala. 529, 535
(1859). This question usually arises where the surety has been compelled to pay the
creditor, and is discussed from the standpoint of whether the surety has exhausted his
remedies, rather than as a question of officiousness. See Note (1924) 29 A. L. R. 273.
22. The court argued that contribution would extend the defendant's liability beyond
the scope its bond was intended to cover. But contracting under the statute, the defendant
was bound to pay, either to the judgment creditor or to its indemnitee, the full loss
occasioned by an accident for which its indemnitee was responsible. Compelling payment
of half this loss would hardly be an extension of this contract.
23. See (1934) 32 MIcH. L. REv. 1011; (1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 507.
24. It is sometimes argued that allowing sureties contribution would in effect enable
their principals to obtain contribution. But a distinction can be drawn between the case
of a surety, who has recourse against his principal, and that of the indemnitor, who has
no recourse against his indemnitee. See Langmaid, supra note 9, at 1007; (1931) 79 U. or
PA. L. REv. 507, 509.
25. The original judgment was certainly final in the sense that it was appealable.
26. The court suggested that the statute was intended for the benefit of judgment
creditors, and no intent to give insurance companies a right to contribution could be
inferred without express provision therefor. But it is only necessary that the statute
create a right-duty relationship between the insurance companies and the judgment cred-
itor. This established, equity provides the right to contribution without the aid of statute.
In Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113 (1866), the court overruled a contention similar
to that made by the court here.
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question of officiousness becomes more difficult. Within that period, the plaintiff
was under a duty to the judgment creditor, subject to the condition that thirty
days from final judgment must first elapse without satisfaction of the judgment.
Payment in such a situation apparently creates a right to contribution only if it
appears certain that the common burden would not be borne by someone outside
the class.20 Here A or B might have satisfied the judgment, thus relieving both
indemnitors of any risk of having to pay the judgment creditor. The concept of
common burden in suits for contribution, however, seems broad enough to meet
this difficulty. The entry of judgment against A and B subjected each indemnitor
to an equal risk of having to bear the loss, either through payment to the judgment
creditor by virtue of the statute, or to its indemnitee under its contract. This
constituted a common burden, although the indemnitors originally undertook dif-
ferent risks,27 being liable under independent contracts to different persons.P
For contribution does not depend on original relationship, and the judgment
placed them in exactly equal positions. Furthermore, this common burden to which
the indemnitors were subject would justify contribution between them, even if
the equality of risk did not continue until the very moment of payment by one
of the indemnitors; that is, if A satisfied the judgment, and thus relieved B's indem-
nitor of the risk before A's indemnitor paid A. For, as a general rule, where parties
have been subject to a common burden, contribution is compelled even though at
the time of payment, one of them has already been discharged, by a release or the
running of the statute of limitations. 30 Accordingly, under the foregoing concept of
a common burden, the plaintiff's payment was clearly non-officious. For the require-
ment of non-officious payment is intended to protect the class from contribution
only where the class might have escaped the common burden had payment not been
made,20 and here the entry of judgment made it certain that one of the two indem-
nitors would have to bear the loss eventually even if A or B satisfied the judg-
ment. Finally, the statute could not have been intended to prevent contribu-
tion, for obviously its only purpose was to facilitate the collection of judgments.
Refusing the indemnitor contribution on the sole ground that payment was
made within the thirty day period would encourage delay of payment until after
the period, through any available means, thus defeating the purpose of the statute.
If considering payment non-officious under these conditions involves any extension of
previous conceptions, it is by no means unparalleled. 3 '
Aside from strictly legal considerations, there are other reasons why contribution
27. In National Surety Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 19 Fed. (2d) 448
(C. C. A. 2d 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 54S (1927), it was stated that contribution will
not be enforced between insurers unless the risk insured is identical. But the important
point is that because of the judgment, the indemnitors were subjected to exactly the same
risk, and what they originally undertook should then have become of no significance.
Cf. Agren v. Staker, 46 Idaho 36, 267 Pac. 460 (1928); Langmaid, supra note 9, at 996;
(1927) 76 U. op PA. L. Pv. 75. But cf. Southern Surety Co. v. Nichols, 239 Mlich. 158,
214 N. W. 137 (1927).
28. Contribution is enforced between co-sureties although they become bound by sep-
arate instruments without knowledge of each other's undertaking. Robin-on v. Boyd,
60 Ohio St. 57, 53 N. E. 494 (1899).
29. Asylum of St. Vincent De Paul v. McGuire, 239 N. Y. 375, 146 N. E. 632 (1925).
30. Kelly v. Sproul, 153 Mlich. 691, 117 N. W. 327 (1908); Young v. Burnett, 81 N. H.
163, 127 Atl. 435 (1923); Johnson v. Harvey, 84 N. Y. 363 (1881); Camp v. Botwick,
20 Ohio St. 337 (1870).
31. Cf. Mlanthey v. Schueler, 126 Blinn. 87, 147 N. W. 824 (1914); Howie v. Gengloff,




would have been desirable.3 2 Ordinary standards of justice are disregarded If the
loss is allowed to fall by accident or according to the whim of the judgment creditor.
More important, the denial of contribution between indemnitors offers a powerful
inducement to collusion33 between one of them and the judgment creditor. If the
latter makes use of this opportunity to extort from the insurance companies more
than the amount of his judgment, the burden ultimately falls on the insuring public.
Again, while the burden of an insurance company may occasionally be lightened
by receiving contribution where its indemnitee happens to be joined as a co-tort-
feasor with another insured party, this remote possibility would hardly tend to
lessen the care used in the choice and supervision of risks, particularly since the
company may well have to make contribution to others for accidents in which its
indemnitee becomes involved. Thus, while the extension of the doctrine of con-
tribution to the situation here involved would apparently have been a slightly new
departure,3 4 there were sound reasons and ample legal justification for such action.
AMORTIZATION OF PREMIUMS AND ACCUMULATION OF DISCOUNTS IN THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF TRUST INVESTMENTS
WHEN trust funds are invested in bonds, the income to go to a beneficiary for life,
with remainders over, the problem arises of securing to the life tenant an adequate in-
come, and at the same time, of preserving the corpus intact for the remainderman. A
bond bought by the trustee at par involves no difficulties, since the entire interest is
income payable to the life tenant. But when an investment is made in a bond pur-
chased at a price greater than its face value, a larger sum is paid than will be returned
when the bond is redeemed at par. To prevent the loss to corpus of this amount paid
as premium, it is the usual practice of trustees to make proportionate deductions from
each interest payment and apply them to a sinking fund which will be equal to the
premium paid when the bonds are matured, thus leaving the principal of the estate
unimpaired. Although the intention of the testator governs in all cases,1 most courts
hold that this practice is proper,2 while in the minority of jurisdictions the loss of
premium is held to devolve on the corpus, and hence is borne by the remainderman.0
32. Most of these other reasons suggested in the text are advanced in Campbell, supra
note 12, at 94. And see Leflar, supra note 2, at 137.
33. Cf. Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn. Rys. Co., 110 Ohio St. 516, 144 N. E. 51
(1924).
34. The only case found involving the same facts is Metropolitan Casualty Insurance
Company of New York v. Union Indemnity Company of Louisiana, 141 Misc. 792, 253 N.Y.
Supp. 324 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd without opinion, 255 N. Y. 591, 175 N. E. 326 (1931)
noted in (1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 400. The plaintiff was there denied recovery, but the
question of contribution directly between the indemnitors was apparently not considered.
1. Shaw v. Cordis, 143 Mass. 443 (1887); Re Hoyt, 160 N. Y. 607, 55 N. E. 282 (1889).
2. Curtis v. Osborn, 79 Conn. 555, 65 A. 968 (1907); New England Trust Co. v. Eaton,
140 Mass. 532, 4 N. E. 69 (1886), (Holmes, J., dissenting), criticized in (1886) 34 Axa, L. J.
144; In re Gartenlaub's Estate, 185 Cal. 648, 198 P. 209 (1921); Ballantine v. Young, 74
N. J. Eq. 572, 70 A. 668 (1908) ; In re Stevens, 187 N. Y. 471, 80 N. E. 358 (1907) ; In re
Well's Estate, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174 (1914).
3. American Security & Trust Co. v. Payne, 33 App. D. C. 178 (1909); Hite v. HIte, 93
Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778 (1892); In re Penn-Gaskell's Estate, 208 Pa. 346, 57 A. 715 (1904).
This was formerly the general rule even in those states where amortization is now compelled.
Hemenway v. Hemenway, 134 Mass. 446 (1883); Matter of Pollock, 3 Redf. 100 (N. Y.
Surr. Ct. 1877); Bergen v. Valentine, 63 How. Pr. 221 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1882); In re New
York Life Ins. Co., 24 Misc. 71, 53 N. Y. S. 382 (Surr. Ct. 1898).
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In the converse of the situation, where a bond is purchased at a discount and is later
repaid at par, the few courts to which the question has been presented have been unani-
mous in refusing to compel trustees to accumulate the discount as income for the life
tenant.4 Both these problems arose in a recent Massachusetts case.5 Trustees pur-
chased bonds at a premium as an investment for part of a trust fund, and amortized
the premium. Other bonds, bought at a discount, matured and were paid at par.0
The difference between the lower price at which the latter bonds were purchased, and
the amount realized at maturity, was credited to principal as a capital gain. In a bill
for an accounting brought by the life tenant, it was claimed that, if there was to be
amortization of premiums for the benefit of the remainderman, there should also be
accumulated and credited to income the discount resulting from the purchase of bonds
below par. The court held that amortization was proper, but rejected the claim of
the life tenant on the ground that gains in the value of investments belong to capital,
and are to be credited to the principal of the trust fund rather than to income.
In those jurisdictions where amortization is compelled, logical consistency would
seem to demand accumulation, for the proposition which supports the one governs the
other.7 The theory upon which amortization is based is that a bond sells at a pre-
mium because it bears a rate of interest greater than the current market rate for sin-
ilar securities.8 Since such a bond will be redeemed only at par, each interest pay-
ment represents not the actual earning of the investment, but more, the excess beinga
return of a proportional part of the principal paid as premium.0 Therefore deductions
are made from each coupon payment, aggregating, at maturity, the amount of the pre-
mium. By this method of accounting, the life tenant has received as income no more
than the investment has actually earned, and the full capital which was used to pur-
chase the bond is restored to the corpus. In like manner proceeds the theory support-
4. In re Estate of Gartenlaub, 198 Cal. 204, 244 P. 348, 48 A. L. R. 677 (1926), noted
in (1926) 15 CAL. L. REv. 66; In re Houston's Will, 19 Del. Ch. 207, 165 A. 132 (1933), noted
in (1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 143; Wood v. Davis, 168 Ga. 504, 148 S. E. 330 (1929); Town-
send v. United States Trust Co., 3 Redf. 220 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1877). This latter case, how-
ever, was decided at a time when amortization of premiums was not yet recognized in New
York. It was approved by way of dictum in Re Accounting of Gerry, 103 N. Y. 445, 9
N. E. 235 (1886), which is often cited as an authority opposed to accumulation of dicounts.
But it does not appear that the bonds in that case were bought below par. The question
may still be considered an open one in New York.
5. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock, 195 N. E. 389 (Mlass. 1935).
6. Trustees purchased bonds having a par value of $13,000 for $12,973.13. Thus at ma-
turity there was a realization of $26.87 more than the cost.
7. See Holmes, J. in Hemenway v. Hemenway, 134 Mlass. 446, 450 (1883), and his diszent
in New England Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 Mass. 532, 544, 547, 4 N. E. 69, 77, 80 (1886);
PzRRY, Trusts (7th ed. 1929) § 548b.
8. This is graphically illustrated by the two bond issues recently offered by the Southern
California Edison Company Ltd. In July, 1935, the Company offered a series of 3ys,
due 1960, at a price of 98Y2%. Two months later, a series of 4s, also due 1960, was offered
at a price of 102%. The same security is behind both bond issues, and their respective yields
to maturity are practically equal. See (July 6, 1935) 141 Commercial & Financial Chronide
XII, and (Sept. 21, 1935) id. at VI. Theoretically, all bonds which are perfectly safe
should be selling at such a price as will produce a net yield equal to the prevailing interest
rate at the time of purchase. See Vierling, Amortiation of Premiums and Accumulation of
Discounts on Trust Investments (1923) 8 ST. Louis L. Riv. 1, 3; A,;xo. (1926) 43 A. L. R.
689. But see note 13, infra.
9. See In re Gartenlaub's Estate, 185 Cal. 648, 652, 198 P. 209, 210 (1921); In re Ste-
vens, 187 N. Y. 471, 476, 80 N. E. 358, 359 (1907).
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ing accumulation of discounts. A bond sells at a discount because it bears a rate of
interest lower than the current market rate for securities of the same grade.8 But
since it will be redeemed at par, there is a rise in the value of the bond toward that
figure as maturity approaches. This appreciation was contracted for at the time of
purchase,' 0 and represents to the trust estate not capital gain, but income earned and
retained in the investment." Thus the interest payments are a part only of what
the bond actually is earning; the balance of the income is only realized when it is sold
or matured at par. Consequently this accretion logically should not be added to cor-
pus, but should accrue to the life tenant as income.
But while the majority of courts have recognized the principle of amortization
in order to preserve the corpus intact,2 they have rejected the argument for accumula-
tion of discounts on the ground that factors other than a bond's interest rate may
determine the price at which it will sell below par.' 2 But it would seem that this is
equally true of bonds selling at a premium.13 A further objection is that payment of
the accumulated income as it accrues would involve the sale of some of the corpus
in order to find funds with which to make annual payments to the life tenant, and if
the bond should later default or be sold at a loss before maturity, an additional dec-
rement is suffered by the corpus. 14 However, the claim is merely that the accumula-
tion should be paid to the life tenant only upon sale or maturity.15 To this it may
be objected that, by the time of realization, the life tenant may have died, or may not
10. In this respect, increases by way of accumulating discount are to be distinguished from
ordinary increases, which are accidental and unanticipated. Since this tendency of a dis-
count bond to "appreciate" is inherent and certain, it may be considered as paid for at the
time of the investment, being figured in the price at which the security is bought. See Vier-
ling, Accumulation of Discounts (1926) 41 J. ACcoUNTANcY, 267, 276; CHAMBEmLAIN AND
EDWARDS, THE PRINCIPLES OF BOND INVESlMENT (rev. ed. 1927) 25, 27.
11. For example, the rate of net yield on a $1,000 bond bearing 4% interest and having
10 years to run, bought at $900.10 is approximately 5.30%. After six months the value of
the bond at the same net yield will be about $903.90. No capital has been added, and It Is
apparent that this $3.80 gain in the invested sum represents earnings. See CHAaBmaIN
A EDWARDS, THE PRImcIPLES OF BOND INvESTMENT (rev. ed. 1927) 524; George K. Black,
Amortization-An Unsettled Question in Trust Accounting (1932) 17 MASS. L. Q. 81, 83.
12. "Purely accidental circumstances may be . . . important factors." In re Houston's
Will, 19 Del. Ch. 207, 213, 165 A. 132, 134 (1933), quoted with approval in the instant case,
at 392. The courts rejecting the principle of amortization of premiums do so for the same
reason. See In re Penn-Gaskell's Estate, 208 Pa. 346, 348, 57 A. 715, 716 (1904).
13. That the premium is paid solely in respect of interest, which is the assumption sup-
porting amortization, is a fiction, is demonstrated by any survey of bond prices. For ex-
ample, Chile Copper Company's debenture 5s, due 1947, have ranged in price from 79 to 100.Y.
since January 1, 1935; Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania's 5s, series B, due 1948, have ranged
from 113%4 to 120Y2 during the same period; Detroit Edison 5s, series A, due 1949 have
fluctuated between 105 j and 109. during the same period. See (Oct. 12, 1935) 141 Com-
mercial & Financial Chronicle, 2403, 2404. See Holmes, J. in Hemenway v. Hemenway, 134
Mass. 446, 449 (1883), and his dissent in New England Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 Mass. 532,
544, 4 N. E. 69, 77 (1886).
14. See In re Houston's Will, 19 Del. Ch. 207, 212, 213, 165 A. 132, 134 (1933). For the
converse reason, that securities bought at a premium may increase In value, the Kentucky
and Pennsylvania courts rejected the principle of amortization. See In re Penn-Gaskell's
Estate, 208 Pa. 346, 348, 349, 57 A. 715, 716 (1904) ; Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 269, 20 S, W.
778, 780 (1892).
15. Gradual payment of the discount before realization would be payment of Income
before it is received by the trustee. This the trustee is under no duty to do, nor has It ever
be the same life tenant who is claimed to have lost the income.13 Thus, the life tenant's
receipt of the discount depends upon the contingencies that the bond will be redeemed
at par, and that he will be alive to receive it. In this respect, discounts and premiums
are on different planes. While the premium is paid out from corpus at the time of
purchase of the bond, the discount remains only an intangibility until the bond is sold
or matured at par. Influenced by these chance elements in trust investments, the Uni-
form Principal and Income Act' 7 proposes to do away with both, and to charge all
loss or gain from sale or redemption of bonds to principal, on the ground that work-
able rules and simplicity of administration are nearest the settlor's probable intent. s
This appears to be a practical solution to an intricate problem, obviating mathematical
and legal hair-splitting, and precluding much of the litiation which might arise from
more detailed accounting practices.' 9 Nor would the Act expose the capital to the
danger of being exhausted. For the trustee's fear of being surcharged for any undue
shrinkage of the corpus, counterbalanced by the life tenant's insistence upon an ade-
quate income, would oblige the trustee to hold an even equilibrium between the oppos-
ing interests, with the result that in the long run, differences on both sides of the ledger
would even themselves out. This procedure has been followed by the minority of
courts,a and two jurisdictions have recently adopted it by statute.2 The application
of the same rule to both life tenant and remainderman has the merit of impartiality,
and where courts do not approve accumulation of discounts, it would seem that fair-
ness to the life tenant, who is, after all, the testator's nearest object of bounty, would
demand the discarding of amortization. The application of one principal for premium
bonds and another for discount bonds is both inconsistent and inequitable. A bal-
anced justice would seem to require either full acceptance of the amortization-accumu-
lation rule or adoption of the simpler Uniform Principal and Income Act.2 '
been urged that he should. See Edgerton, Premiums and Discounts in Trust Accounts (1918)
31 HARv. L. R.v. 447, 467; George K. Black, Avzortization-An unsettled Question in Trust
Accounting (1932) 17 Mass. L. Q. 81, 85. But courts have always proceeded on the assump-
tion that this was the method contemplated. See Holmes, 3. dissenting in New England
Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 Mass. 532, 544, 547, 4 N. E. 69, 77, 80 (1886) ; In re Houston's Will,
19 Del. Ch. 207, 212, 213, 165 A. 132, 134 (1933).
16. See the instant case, at 392.
17. Section 6 (1931) 41 HANDBOOK OF TE NATIONAL CounuRNC OF COassussO'ns ,
332, noted in (1932) 32 CoL. L. Rxv. 118, 121.
18. See (1931) 41 HADuoon or THE NATioAL. Coz rERuc or Co a1nssxoums, 326.
19. There are three methods of amortizing. (1) The premium is charged out of the in-
come at once, without taking into account the interest on the amortization fund up to the
time of maturity of the bond. (2) The level method, by which an equal amount is deducted
from each income payment during the life of the bond, again without considering the interest
on the amortization fund. (3) The mathematical method, which necessitates a new computa-
tion at each interest payment date, taking account of interest on funds previously amortized.
Only the last method is technically accurate, but to insist on it would inflict unnecessary
hardship on trustees in many cases, especially where the premium is small. Other problems
arise where a bond having a call date is bought. If the premium is amortized to the call
date and price, and the bond is not called, a new amortization schedule has to be fixed. But
the life tenant has been treated unfairly in the meantime.
20. OR. L. 1931, c. 371, § 6; Rav. L. HAwAii (1935) c. 135, § 4714.
21. Cf. RESTATEmrNT, TRUSTS § 239, comment f, § 240, comment h.
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THE USE OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN PATENT CASES
When a patent is infringed, the patentee may at his election maintain an action for
damages1 or for an injunction coupled with damages2 against an infringing manufac-
turer or his dealers.3 A patentee has the further privilege of publicly alleging the sup-
posed infringement and of warning the customers of the manufacturer of his intention
to bring suit against all who deal in the product in question.4 On the other hand, until
the enactment of the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act,3 an alleged infringer could
not maintain an action against the threatening patentee to determine the validity of
these allegations of infringement, but was compelled to await the patentee's infringement
suit for an adjudication of his legal rights. 6 Since public allegations of infringement
intimidate dealers into not handling the product and thereby seriously injure the
manufacturer's business, 7 the patentee was so situated that by abusing his privileges
he could usually force a settlement from the former without risking a judicial deter-
mination of any unfounded claims.8 For a patentee could merely refuse to bring an
action and confine his activities to public threats and warnings. He might go further
and bring suit, advertising that fact to the trade, and, after postponing trial for some
time, might finally effect a dismissal without prejudice. 9 Since a patentee may sue
any infringer at his election, he could bring action against a remote dealer in the
hope of obtaining a default judgment that he could employ to give more force to his
claims of infringement. If the manufacturer attempted to intervene in such a suit, or
if the dealer contested, the patentee then might ask for a dismissal without prejudice,
1. REv. STAT. § 4919 (1875), 35 U. S. C. A. § 67 (1929).
2. 42 STAT. 392 (1922), 35 U. S. C. A. § 70 (1929).
3. See Foote v. Parsons Non-Skid Co., 196 F. 951, 953 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912); Elliot Co.
v. Roto Co., 242 F. 941, 942 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917); I. T. S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co.,
270 F. 593, 608 (D. Mass., 1920). Under Equity Rule 37, the manufacturer might be allowed
to intervene in the action against his dealer (Rules of Practice for courts of Equity as amended
to 1932).
4. See Clip Bar Mfg. Co. v. Steel Protected Concrete Co., 209 F. 874, 875 (E. D. Pa.,
1913) and cases there cited.
5. 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (1934).
6. See Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U. S. 434, 441 (1871); Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear
Dental Vulcanite Co., Fed. Cas. No. 2,543 at 349, 350 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1876).
7. See Price Hollister Co. v. Worford, 18 F. (2d) 129, 130 (S. D. N. Y., 1926) (alleged
infringer's trade had been decreased by 607 in less than one year because of the intimidation).
See also Robb, Suggestions for Patent Law Revision (1925) 7 J. PATENT OFFICE SocEYrv 424,
427; SPENCER, UNITED STATES PATENT LAW SYsTEM (1931) 47, 48. Cf. TERRELL, PATENTS
(English), (1934) 355, 356, 365.
8. See SPENCER, UN'ITED STATES PATENT LAw SYSTM (1931) 47; WAITV, PATENT LAv/
(1920) 299, 300.
9. See United Motors Service Inc. v. Tropic Aire Inc., 57 F. (2d) 479 (C. C. A. 8th,
1932); Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Holland, 160 F. 768 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, 1907);
Pennsylvania Globe Gaslight Co. v. Globe Gaslight Co., 121 F. 1015 (C. C. Mass., 1902).
However, where the dismissal would affect a "substantial right" of the defendant, It cannot
be obtained without prejudice. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transportation Co.,
171 U. S. 138, 146 (1897); Dooley Improvements Inc. v. Motor Improvement Inc., 6 F.
Supp. 161, 162 (D. Del., 1934). In patent cases, it has been held that the mere annoyance
of another action is not sufficient to deprive defendant of a substantial right. See N. Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Driggs, 72 F. (2d) 833, 834 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Staude Mfg. Co. v. Labombarde,
229 F. 1004, 1006 (D. N. H., 1916); Young v. Samuels & Brother, Inc., 232 F. 784, 785 (D. R.
L, 1916); cf. Lunati v. Marnoll Steel Products Co., 10 F. Supp. 282 (E. D. N. Y., 1935);
A. C. Gilbert Co. v. United Electrical Mfg. Co., 33 F. (2d) 760 (E. D. Mich., 1929).
and thus prevent any judicial adjudication of his claims. Only when the patentee
abused his privileges so flagrantly as to be guilty of unfair competition, was a measure
of relief available to the alleged infringer. In that case, if the latter could demonstrate
that the patentee was acting with malicious intent to destroy the infringer's property, or
in bad faith, which is evidenced by failure to bring suit over an unreasonable period
of time, an injunction might be obtained against the continuance of the allegations of
infringement and the threats of suit.10 But the efficacy of this relief is questionable,
since the action for injunction is concerned only with unfair competition and cannot
determine the issue of infringement."
The enactment of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act 5 gave rise to expectations
that this abuse of a patentee's privileges could now be halted. -' For the declaration
seems to provide a means whereby an immedaite adjudication of issues raised by
allegations of infringement may be obtained by the alleged infringer, and unfounded
assertions quickly silenced.' 3 One of the first attempts to realize these possibilities
was made in the recent case of Zenie Bros. v. Miskend.14 Here the defendant patentee
had threatened the petitioner and his customers with actions for infringement, but
had declined to bring suit. The alleged infringer thereupon petitioned for a declaration
that the patents in question were void for want of invention and that consequently
he had not infringed upon a valid patent. The latter's motion to dismiss the peittion,
on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of a petition of this character, was
denied.' 5
10. Racine Paper Goods Co. v. Dittgen, 171 F. 631 (C. C. A. 7th, 1909) (threats for 7
years); Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper Underwear Co., 210 F. 347 (E. D. Wis., 1913); An-
driance Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 F. 827 (C. C. A. 2d, 193) (threats con-
tinued for 6 years); Sun laid Raisin Growers v. Avis, 25 F. (2d) 303 (N. D. Ill., 1923)
(threats for 2 years). But d. Kidd v. Horry, 28 F. 773 (C. C. E. D. Pa., 1886); Steward
Davit and Equipment Corp. v. Welin Davit and Boat Co., 299 F. 610 (E. D. N. Y., 1924);
Deyhydro v. Trelolite Co., 53 F. (2d) 273, 274 (N. D. Old, 1931); Boston Diatite Co. v.
Florence Mifg. Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873).
11. See Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46, 51 (C. C. N. D. IM., 1888).
12. Comment (1934) 8 UNiv. or CinN. L. Rv. 523, 528. See also Rossiman, Declaratory
Judgment (1935) 17 J. PAT= OmrcE Socrzrv 1; cf. Revision of Arericarn Patent Laws
(1934) 16 J. PATE=T O mc Socrr 731, 741; O'Brien, Restrictions Vpon the Usefud.'.e. of
Declaratory Judgment in Patent Swits (1935) 17 J. PAmnr OmcE SocaMn 270, 274, 275.
The English patent statute specifically allows a threatened infringer to have recourse to a
declaration that such threats are unjustified. See TnE PA=='r A D. Diemms Acr, 7 Edw.
VII, c. 29 § 36 (1) (1907), as amended by 22 & 23 GEo. V, c. 32, § 6 (1) (1932). See al-o
Tm= L, op. cit. supra note 7, at 356, 365.
13. See BoecnAcA, DEcLARATORY juacmENs (1934) 25, 26, 583. The declaration may
be thus utilized not only in a direct petition, but by way of counterclaim in the patentee's
action for infringement. This procedure would prevent any dismissal without prejudice
of the original action (see note 9 supra). See Harris, Counterclaiming for Declaratory Re-
l&f (1935) 17 J. PATENT OsracE Socmrv 244; also report of two recent cases in Note (1935)
17 3. PATmT OmrcF Socmrv 674.
14. 10 F. Supp. 779 (S. D. N. Y., 1935). See cases reported by Rossman, op. cit. =pra
note 12, at 5-9, and also Lionel Corp. v. DeFilippis, 11 F. Supp. (E. D. N. Y. 1035) 712.
15. Compare the decision in the principal case (note 14, supra) with Automotive Equip-
ment Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 11 F. Supp. 292 (W. D. N. Y, 1935) where Intition for
declaration of non-infringement was dismissed as unnecessary because the patentee had
previously brought action against certain customers of the petitioner for infringement and all




The contention that the federal courts may not hear an alleged infringer's petition
for declaratory judgment is based upon his previous inability to maintain an action
against the patentee to determine the validity of charges of infringement.0 It is
argued, in the first place, that these allegations are mere assertions by the patentee of
his rights, and do not constitute injuries to the alleged infringer which can be corrected
or prevented by judicial action.10 However, this argument overlooks the fact that an
actual injury is not a prerequisite to obtaining judicial relief by declaration. The
declaratory judgment recognizes the right of a person to remain free from unjustified
claims that disturb the security of his legal interests, and accordingly offers a means
whereby immunity to such claims may be judicially established.1 7 It is further con-
tended, however, that equitable relief has hitherto been denied to the alleged infringer
on the ground that a patent is a government grant, and may therefore not be attacked
by a private party,'8 and that this objection still prevails against a petition for a declara-
tion of non-infringement. But the early concept of a patent as an inviolate govern-
ment grant has been largely modified, and a patent is now recognized as a private
monopoly exercised for private profit.' 9 Under the patent laws a suit in equity could
always be maintained by a private party to cancel an interfering patent,20 and an un-
successful applicant, by asking for a judicial adjudiction of his right to a patent, could
obtain a determination of the validity of a prior patent. 2' Although no specific statu-
tory provision has been made to allow a person to obtain a judicial decision on the
validity of a patent which he is alleged to have infringed, the Declaratory Judgment
Act5 was passed for the express purpose of affording a remedy in cases not formerly
susceptible of judicial relief under the then existing forms. The Act makes no excep-
tion of patent cases, and since it provides a remedy which is eminently suited to re-
lieve the harsh position in which alleged patent infringers have been heretofore placed,
a petition for a declaration of non-infringement of a patent should be entertained by
the federal courts.22
16. Judicial relief could be obtained only when the defendant's conduct constituted un-
fair competition. Cf. notes 10 and 11, supra.
17. See BoRCHARD, op. cit. supra note 13, at 38, 91, 319, 335, 386-389, 419-421. In English
practice, the possibility of a mere declaration of a no-right in the party against whom the
declaratory judgment is sought was first appreciated after the adoption of the rule making
unnecessary the issuance of consequent relief after declarations of rights. Compare part (1)
of present Federal Act, 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (1934). See Guaranty Trust Co.
of N. Y. v. Hannay & Co. (1915) 2 K. B. 536, 565 (declaration of petitioner's immunity to
claims based on forged bills of lading); Dyson v. Att'y-General (1911) 1 K. B. 410, (1912)
1 Ch. 158; Burghes v. Att'y-General (1911) 2 Ch. 139, (1912) 1 Ch. 173 (petitioner's Im-
munity to a government demand).
18. Cf. Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U. S. 434, 441 (1871).
19. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 130 (1932), overruling Long v. Rock-
wood, 277 U. S. 142 (1928), which had denied the state's power to tax income derived from
patents. Moreover, a patent is surely not more inviolate than a statute, and yet a declara-
tion may be used to attack the latter's validity. Penn v. Glenn, 10 F. Supp. 483 (W. D. IZy.,
1935) (decision overruled by statute as regards the use of the declaration to prevent collec-
tion of taxes), noted in (1935) 44 YALE L. 3. 1451; see Borchard, op. cit. supra note 13, at
552, 553.
20. Rzv. STAT. § 4918 (1875), 35 U. S. C. A. § 66 (1929).
21. REv. STAT. § 4915 (1875), 35 U. S. C. A. § 63 (1929).
22. See Jaeger v. Jaeger, 44 REP. PAT. CASES 83 (1927); Killen v. MacMillan, 49 Rr,
PAT. CASES 258, 261 (1932) ; cf. Traction Corp. v. Bennett, 25 REP,. PAT. CAsEs 819 (1908) ;
North Eastern Marine Engineering Co. v. Leeds Forge Co. (1906) 1 Ch. 324, aff'd (1906)
2 Ch. 498; Felt Gas Compressing Co. v. Felt (1913) 14 D. L. R. 395. Of significant Interest,
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The further argument 23 that recognition of this procedure in patent cases would
hamper the patentee in the enjoyment of his exclusive monopoly contrary to the intent
of Congress, because he would be subjected to a multiplicity of vexatious actions
brought all over the country by parties desirous of establishing non-infringement,2
disregards the fact that the existence of a controversy is a requisite to declaratory re-
lief.25 Since no controversy can exist here until the patentee has made a demand upon
the alleged infringer, or threatened suit against him or his customers, the number of
actions that are brought depends solely upon the patentee.20  Moreover, if he has
threatened suit in good faith, and an infringement of a valid patent does exist, then
he ought not to object to the infringer's action for declaratory relief, for he can there
obtain an adjudication of the same issues which would be presented by his suit for
patent infringement.
because of its resemblance to the declaratory process, is a practice common in the SL'th
Circuit. Here, after an adjudication of patent infringement in the suit by patentee, the court
on application by the defendant will declare whether a new model or specification would
also infringe upon said patent. See Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder Co. v. Proudfit Loose
Leaf Co, 243 F. 895, 898 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); Knabe Bros. Piano Co. v. American Piano
Co., 232 F. 140, 141 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916); cf. Hollinrhead Co. v. Baick Mfg. Co., S0 F.
(2d) 592, 593 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); Cincinnati Car Co. v. N. Y. Rapid Transit Corp, 52 F.
(2d) 44, 45 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
23. Another argument against allowing a petition for a declaration of non-infringement
is that it merely anticipates the defense that would ordinarily be interposed to the patentee's
action for infringement, and therefore should be dismissed as unnecessary. See Honour v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (1900) 1 Ch. 852, 854; cf. Automotive
Equipment Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 11 F. Supp. 292 (W. D. N. Y., 1935). But cf. Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Richmond, 107 Conn. 117, 139 Atl. 702 (1927). It is also argued that
the declaratory judgment procedure is unsuitable to patent litigation, since as a summary
process, it is not adaptable to cases where the facts are complicated, or seriously in dispute.
See Rosman, op. cit. supra note 14, at 3, 5; Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act (1934) 21 VA. L. REv. 35, 47. Both these objections, however, are merely appeals to the
court's discretion, and have no weight where relief by declaration is the sole remedy avail-
able. See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 13, at 68, 110, 114, 115, 178. See also Part 3 of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (1934), which provides for
reference of issues to a jury, thus indicating legislative recognition of the possibility of com-
plicated issues of fact being tried in a suit for declaratory relief.
24. Stripling and Thomas, Declaratory Judgments in Patent Cases (1935) 17 J. PiA=-r
OFcE Socrr 422.
25. Part 1 of the Act confines the issuance of the declaratory judgment to cases of "actual
controversy" 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (1934). Cf. O'Brien, Restrictions on the Use-
fulness of Declaratory Judgment in Patent Suits (1935) 17 J. PATENT OraCc Socxnr, 270,
278.
26. It appears evident that the threatened dealer may also have recourse to relief by
declaration. The question arises, however, whether a general allegation of infringement
would be sufficient to create a controversy between the patentee and all dealers in the pro-
duct. This issue probably will not be raised since the manufacturer, as the party most in-
terested in obtaining an adjudication, would ordinarily petition immediately for a declara-
tion of non-infringement and assure his dealers that the matter was being settled. See notes
3, 12 and 25 supra.
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VALIDITY OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
THOUGH all trusts which are designed to assure the cestui que trust a life interest
which cannot be transferred by him nor attached by his creditors are often loosely
designated as spendthrift trusts, it is more accurate to classify trusts with this com-
mon purpose as discretionary trusts, trusts for support, and the true spendthrift
trusts.1 In the discretionary trust, the settlor protects his cestui by providing that he
may receive only so much of the income as the trustee in his absolute discretion sees
fit to give him.2 Though there may be no express prohibition upon seizure by creditors
in this type of trust, it has universally been held that creditors cannot attach nor can
the cestui alienate since neither can compel the trustee to exercise his discretionary
power 3 Somewhat less discretion is given to the trustee in the trust for support since
it is usually provided in such cases that the cestui shall be paid as much of the income
as is necessary for his support.4 Here also voluntary and involuntary alienation is
prevented, not necessarily by virtue of express prohibitions but rather because of the
indefinite nature of the cestui's interest. 5 While these trusts have been unanimously
upheld, a great controversy has arisen concerning the true spendthrift trust, ,in which
the trustee is under an absolute duty to pay a sum certain to the cestui who is pro-
tected in the trust agreement solely by express prohibitions against seizure by creditors
and against voluntary assignment. The prohibition against seizure by creditors is
chiefly responsible for the conflicting views. When the cestui of a trust has an un-
qualified right to payment, it follows that his creditor would be permitted to attach
the payments in the hands of the trustee unless the courts are willing to give effect
to the settlor's prohibition upon seizure. Since the legal arguments on the one hand
that a creditor may attach each absolute right of his debtor and on the other that a
settlor may restrict or regulate the use of his gift, are irreconcilable, the holding of each
jurisdiction upon the validity of the spendthrift trust has been based upon its own view
as to the trust's social utility.6 Though most of the American decisions before 1880,
1. See RETAT ENT, TRusTs (Tent. Draft, 1931) § 148, 150, 151; 1 BoomRT, TRusTs AND
TRusTEEs (1935) § 226.
2. Funk v. Grulke et al., 204 Iowa 314, 213 N. W. 608 (1927); Brown v. Lumbert, 221
Mass. 419, 108 N. E. 1079 (1915); Wolfman v. Webster et al., 77 N. H. 24, 86 Atl, 299
(1913).
3. Foley v. Hastings, 107 Conn. 9, 139 Atl. 305 (1927) ; In re Baeder's Estate, 190 Pa. 614,
42 Atl. 1104 (1899); see RESTATz T, TRusTs (Tent. Draft, 1931) § 151.
4. Baker v. Brown et al., 146 Mass. 369, 15 N. E. 783 (1888); Abbott v. Abbott et al.,
76 N. H. 225, 81 Atl. 699 (1911); Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Ati. 258 (1887).
5. Parker, Holmes & Co. v. Bushnell, 80 Conn. 233, 67 Atl. 479 (1907); Meek v. Brigga
et al., 87 Iowa 610, 54 N. W. 456 (1893); Mitchell et al. v. Choctaw Bank, 107 Miss. 314,
65 So. 278 (1914); see RFSTATEmENT, TRusis (Tent. Draft, 1931) § 150.
6. "That it shall be alienable by and subject to the debts of its beneficial owner Is not an
essential element of any estate . . . in the sense that it is a logical impossibility for such
an estate to exist without these incidents. Wherever it is held that such provisions are
invalid, upon final analysis it will be found that the true reason for the holding is not that
such provisions are repugnant to or inconsistent with the estate granted or given, but that
it is deemed to be against public policy as it is declared by the common and/or statute law
to permit them to be attached to the estate in question." Epes, J. in Sheridan v. Krause,
161 Va. 873, 893, 172 S. E. 508, 514 (1934).
On the one hand it is argued that the spendthrift trust is pernicious because it encour-
ages the accumulation of fortunes in single hands, protects the able-bodied in most instances,
takes property out of commerce, and permits the evasion of just debts. On the other hand
it is contended that since the property settled belongs to the settlor, he should be allowed
to dictate the manner in which it is to be used, especially since the spendthrift trust pro-
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following the English decisions, invalidated attempted spendthrift trusts,7 the trend
since that time in the United States has been sharply toward recognition, until today
the great majority of American courts uphold them.8
• In a recent decision,9 the New Hampshire supreme court, ruling for the first time
on the validity of the spendthrift trust, disregarded the great weight of authority,
and became the first jurisdiction since Gray's classic denunciation of spendthrift trusts
to follow his views.' 0 Settlor gave property to a trustee with instructions to pay to
the cestui que trust $5000 annually out of the net income of the trust, and with the
further provision that the income ". . . shall not be assigned, alienated or pledged in
any manner, or be subject to attachment or any indebtedness.. ." of the cestuL A
judgment creditor of the cestui brought a creditor's bill, seeking to charge the cestui's
right to payment from the annuity. The court held that, since the cestui's absolute
right to payment from the trust was a "credit" within the meaning of the trustee
process statute which provided that all "credits" of the beneficiary in the trustee's
possession could be attached, the provision against seizure was void and consequently
that the annuity was attachable. Though a discussion of the prohibition upon voluntary
alienation was not necessary to a disposition of this case, the court further indicated
that this prohibition would probably be held valid should this question be litigated.
Since in practically all instances courts have treated both types of restraint as neces-
sarily complimentary,11 the instant decision is unique in holding that the restraint on
tects the weak and improvident. In addition, it is argued in favor of the spendthrift trust
that it neither deceives creditors, since public records and credit ratings are available,
nor ties up property unduly nor tends to accumulate fortunes, since the trust i5 but for a
lifetime and since its purpose is not enlargement of the trust estate. See Nichols, Assignee v.
Eaton et al., 91 U. S. 716, 726 (1875); 2 BoorRT, TRUsTs Aim TRusrmxs (1935) § 222; GnAy,
RoSTRAT ox T A=NATiOx or PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895) vi; Brown, Spendtlrift Trusts
(1902) 54 Czrr. L. J. 382, 387; Costigan, Spendthrift Trusts Reexamined (1934) 22 CAr. L.
REv. 471, 483, 487, 489, 497.
7. GRAy, op. eit. supra note 6, at 169.
8. 1 BOGFRT, TRUsTS Awn TpusTFrs 723; see Runk, Mfodifications of the Rule Against
Perpetuities (1932) So U. or PA. L. REv. 397, 405; Comment (1931) 29 Mcm. L. REV. 493;
(1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1116, 1117.
9. Brahmey v. Rollins et al, 179 AUl. 186 (N. H. 1935).
10. See LEAcH, CAsES & MATERiALS oN THE LAw or Furu= Iirzmmrs (1935) 963.
11. Courts have uniformly treated the two prohibitions as complimentary. Hence when
a trust instrument which contains but one of the prohibitions is construed by a court, the
misng provision is usually implied. Prohibition against seizure implied from presence of
prohibition on voluntary alienation: Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247 (18S4); Jouvenat v.
Continental Nat'l Bk., 253 Ill. App. 400 (1929); Partridge v. Cavender, 96 Mo. 452, 9 S. W.
785 (1888); Matthews v. Van Cleve, 282 Mo. 19, 221 S. W. 34 (1920); Winthrop Co. v.
Clinton, 196 Pa. 472, 46 At. 435 (1900); White v. O'Bryan, 148 Tenn. 18, 251 S. W. 785
(1923) ; see Jones v. Harrison, 7 F. (2d) 461, 465 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) ; RESTATE=E, TRus"M
(Tent. Draft, 1931) § 148; (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 480. Prohibition against voluntary
alienation implied from presence of prohibition against seizure: Commissioner of Int. Rev.
v. Blair, 60 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Shankland's Appeal, 47 Pa. 113 (1864); see
Jones v. Harrison, supra, at 465; REsrATEL=, TRUSTS, supra at § 148; (1933) 81 U. or PA.
L. Rnv. 480. Contra: Ames v. Clark, 106 Mass. 573 (1871); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Luke, 220 Mass. 484, 108 N. E. 64 (1915); but see Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 240 U. S. 427 (1916); Griswold, Beneficiary of Spendthrift Trust (1929) 43 HIwnv.
L. Rnv. 63, 77. On the other hand, the desire of the courts to treat the two prohibitions
as complimentary often has resulted in the holding that since a single prohibition is not enough
to create a spendthrift trust, the single prohibition is void. Single prohibition against seizure
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seizure may be invalidated without destroying the restraint on alienation. This dis-
tinction between the two types of restraints was justified on the ground that, while
the right to alienate is an element of ownership which a donor may withhold, on the
other hand the right of creditors to seize is a right of third parties conferred by law
and not subject to any power of the donor to withhold or grant. Further, such a dis-
tinction was held more equitably to balance the interests of creditors and cestuis, since
the restraint on alienation protects the cestui somewhat, without prejudicing his credi-
tors as does the restraint on seizure.
While such a balancing of the interests of creditors and cestuis has been effected
in ten jurisdictions through spendthrift trust statutes whereby creditors are allowed
to reach the surplus funds of the trust which are not needed by the beneficiary for
his support, 12 it is questionable whether the instant device of distinguishing between
prohibitions on seizure and alienation leaves any real protection to the cestui of the
spendthrift trust. For, while the restraint on alienation prevents the cestui from assign-
ing his future interest in the income, nevertheless, since the creditor ordinarily can levy
upon the future rights to payment from the trust income,13 the cestui, by going so
heavily into debt that his debts exceed the total income from the trust, can lose all
benefit from the funds through creditors' suits. Indeed, the only practical effect of
the distinction made by the New Hampshire court seems to be to further protect
creditors to the extent that the restraint on alienation may tend to prevent preferen-
tial assignments of income by the debtor. In reality, therefore, the decision appears
to nullify the purpose of the spendthrift trust, thus affording a precedent to those
seeking new weapons in the attack on the present American rule validating spend-
thrift trusts.
POWER OF FEDERAL COURTS TO DIRECT A JUDGMENT CONTRARY TO VERDICT OF JURY
AT COMMON law, when the pleadings presented no material issue of fact, but a ver-
dict of the jury was nevertheless taken, that verdict could be disregarded by the trial
or appellate court, and judgment directed according to the state of the pleadings. 1
Thus, if the defendant confessed the plaintiff's allegations, and plead, by way of de-
fense, facts which would not constitute a bar even if true, a judgment non obstante
verdicto might be entered for plaintiff even though the jury rendered a verdict for the
defendant.2 Or if plaintiff's allegations, even if true, would not entitle him as a matter
of law to recover, a jury verdict for the plaintiff might be set aside and judgment
directed for the defendant upon motion to arrest judgment on the verdict.3 Where,
however, the pleadings presented a material issue of fact and the jury returned a ver-
void: Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Electric Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243 (1911); Ullman v.
Cameron, 186 N. Y. 339, 78 N. E. 1074 (1906); In re Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. 228, 72 At.
498 (1909); see Bergmann v. Lord, 194 N. Y. 70, 75, 86 N. E. 828, 830 (1909). Single pro-
hibition against voluntary alienation void: Newcomb v. Masters, 287 Ill. 26, 122 N. E. 85
(1919).
12. See 2 POWELL, CAseS oN ThusTs AND ESTATES (1933) 859 n.
13. Hamilton v. Drogo, 241 N. Y. 401, 150 N. E. 496 (1926); see 1 BoaoER, TRusT AND
TRUSTEES § 193.
1. SmurHr, AN AcioN AT LAW (3d London ed. 1848) 161.
2. United States v. Gardner, 133 Fed. 285 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904); Bradshaw v. I-edge &
Heaton, 10 Iowa 402 (1860); Burdick v. Green, 18 Johns. 14 (N. Y. 1820); Cook v. Pearce,
8 Q. B. 1044 (1843); Atkinson v. Davies, 11 M. & W. 236 (Ex. 1843).
3. Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439 (N. Y. 1820); Phelps v. Baldwin, 17 Conn. 209
(1845) ; Harbin v. Hunt, 151 Ga. 60, 105 S. E. 842 (1921).
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dict for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held in Slocunt v. New 1ro7h. Life Insurance
Co.4 that neither the trial court nor the appellate court could thereafter direct a ver-
dict for the defendant on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury's verdict, but must order a new trial.5 The basis of the holding was that, when
the court rejects the jury's findings of fact, it at the same time reopens the issues of
fact and can enter a judgment contrary to that of the jury only by itself determining
those issues, which is contrary to the Seventh Amendment.0
That decision was not binding on state courts, since it was merely an interpreta-
tion of the Seventh Amendment, which is a restriction only upon the federal govern-
ment.7 And since a necessary consequence of adherence to the Slocuns, decision would
be prolonged litigation, most states have refused to follow it. Some courts have
placed their decisions on the ground that their state constitutions merely provide that
trial by jury shall remain inviolate, rather than that "no fact tried by the jury shall
be otherwise re-examined... than according to the rules of the common law," as does
the Seventh Amendment.8 Other state courts have declined to follow the Slocurm case
on the ground that it was an incorrect interpretation of the common law.P While
federal courts were bound by the decision, efforts were soon made to escape the effect
of the ruling by resort to the common law method of reservation by the court of deci-
sion upon a question of law until after the jury had rendered its verdict.' 0 By this
method the trial or appellate courts could set aside a verdict of the jury and direct
judgment according to the question of law taken under reservation."
This device was attempted in the recent case of Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v.
Donald Redman.12 Defendant, at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence,
moved for a directed verdict and a dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff. The court reserved
decision on these motions and submitted the case to the jury, who returned a verdict
for the plaintiff. Thereafter the court denied the defendant's motions and accordingly
4. 228 U. S. 364 (1913).
5. This case has been severely criticized. See Thayer, Judicial Administration (1915)
63 U. or PA. L. Pzv. 585; Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure (1918)
31 HARv. L. Rnv. 669; Comment (1914) 23 Yrn L. J. 454; Note (1913) 47 Aar. L. Rm.
906; Note (1914) 26 GREm BAG 106. But -ee Schofield, New Trials and the Seventh Amend-
ment (1913-1914) 8 ILL. L. Rv. 287, 381, 465.
6. The Seventh Amendment provides, "In suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury sall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than accord-
ing to the rules of the common law."
7. Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U. S. 532 (1874); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1875);
Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 294 (1877).
8. Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 467, 102 N. E. 665 (1913); Gulf &
Ship Island Rr. Co. v. Hales, 140 Miss. 829, 105 So. 458 (1925) ; 2 T-ou&PsoN, Trss (2d ed.
1912) 1478 (collection of the various constitutional provisions).
9. Wayland v. Latham, 89 Cal. App. 55, 264 Pac. 766 (1928); Vandenburg v. Kaat, 252
Mlih. 187, 233 N. W. 220 (1930).
10. Hoffman v. American Mills Co., 288 Fed. 768 (C. C.A. 2d, 1923); Italian StarLine,
Inc. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 2d,
1931); see Clemence v. Hudson & Manhattan Ry. Co., 11 F. (2d) 913, 917 (C. C. A. 2d,
1926); Bohenik v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 49 F. (2d) 722, 724 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
11. Carleton v. Griffin, 1 Burrows Rep. 549 (K. B. 1758); Dublin, Wicklow, & Wexford
Railway Co. v. Slattery, 3 App. Cas. 1155 (1878); see 3 BL. Codea. (Lewis e. 1897) 373;
TkAynz, PRELunNARY TREATiSE oN EvmmcE (1898) 240.
12. 55 Sup. Ct. 890 (1935).
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entered judgment for the plaintiff. Upon appeal, the circuit court of appeals held
the evidence insufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff, but believing the Slocun
case controlling precedent, ordered a new trial, rather than direct a verdict for de-
fendant.13 Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, it was held that since the trial
court had reserved decision on the motions of defendant, the circuit court upon a finding
of insufficiency of evidence should have directed a proper judgment rather than remit
the case for a new trial. The court based its decision on the fact that at common
law a court could direct a verdict for one party despite a jury verdict for the other,
when the court had reserved decision on a question of law relative to the suit. Since
such a procedure was proper at common law, its use by the federal court was held
not violative of the Seventh Amendment.14 The Slocum case was distinguished solely
upon the ground that there the court had made no reservation of power to grant or
deny, subsequent to the jury verdict, a motion for a directed verdict.
Apparently the distinction between the case where there had been a reservation
and where there had not been was based on the common law theory that, in the case
where a reservation had been taken, the jury consented to allow the court's ultimate
ruling on the question of law to be a part of its verdict. Accordingly, when the court
finally decided as a matter of law that there was insufficient evidence to support a
verdict for the plaintiff, and that judgment should therefore have been entered for
the defendant, a direction to that effect would not mean that the jury's verdict had
been overruled, or the province of the jury invaded, for it had consented to such a
judgment being entered. While at an early date the express consent of the jury
may have been obtained, subsequently that consent was merely presumed, and it appar-
ently lay solely within the court's discretion to reserve decision upon a question of
law, or not.15 Actually, therefore, there seems to be no practical difference between the
case where there has been and where there has not been a reservation of power by the
court. In either case, the court is answering the same question of law, that is, whether
there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff, and granting or deny-
ing the motion accordingly. The degree of interference with the jury's function, if
any, in each case is obviously the same. Hence, the distinction between the two cases
is reduced to a mere question of form.
It seems clear that the distinction which affords a means of reconciling the Slocum
and the present case was seized upon by the Court so as to avert the effects of the
former case without directly overruling it. Insofar as that purpose is accomplished, the
decision may be hailed as a salutary one. Nevertheless, it does leave open an oppor-
tunity for needless trials, when a trial judge inadvertently fails to reserve his decision
on a question of law. Moreover, it raises questions as to what shall constitute a proper
reservation. In the instant case, the court mentions the fact that plaintiff's counsel
made no objection to the reservation by the court. From this, it may be implied that, If
plaintiff had made such objection, the result may have been different. While the weight
of authority seems to hold that the reservation of a question of law is taken with
the tacit consent of the jury only, and not that of counsel,' 5 it has forcefully been
contended that the parties' consent is needed to reserve a question of law.10 In any
event, the result of the instant case is to leave the matter unsettled as yet in the fed-
eral courts. 17 Finally, it seems as undesirable to require a new trial when there has
13. Donald Redman v. Baltimore & Caroline Line, Inc., 70 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934).
14. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1 (1899).
15. See Thayer, supra note 5, at 601; Scott, supra note 5, at 685; Note (1913) 47 Am. L.
Rxv. 906, 908; Note (1914) 26 GRrm BAG 106, 112; 2 TDo, PRAc-rca (2d Am. ed. 1828) 931.
16. See Schofield, supra note 5.
17. A state court has found it to be at the discretion of the court. Blyth v. Quinby &
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been no reservation as when there has been one. It would appear that, in the interests
of simplifying and speeding up federal procedure, an overruling of the Slocur case
would be preferable to the result of the instant case.
PROCESS PATENT PROTECTION BY EXCLUSION Or FOREIGN PRODUCTS UNDE TAtm r AcT
THE defendant Amtorg Trading Corporation sought to import into this country six
thousand tons of phosphate, an unpatented product produced in Russia by a flotation
process which was protected in this country by a United States process patent. The
licensees of the owner of the patent, remediless under the patent law which
operates only "within the United States, and the Territories thereof,"' com-
plained to the United States Tariff Commission that the foreign use of the patented
process, and the importation and sale of the product, was unlawful under section 337
of the Tariff Act of 1930 as an unfair method of competition and unfair act.2 The
Tariff Commission, finding that the patented process had been used, held, in accordance
with a prior holding of the Court of Customs and Patents Appeals,3 that the importation
of the phosphate was unlawful. A presidential order of exclusion then issued, as pro-
vided by section 337. On appeal the Court of Customs and Patents Appeals, distin-
guishing one of its prior decisions and expressly overruling another in part,4 reversed
the Commission's decision.5 The court distinguished between the importation of
patented products, to which the Act admittedly applied, and of unpatented products
made abroad by a patented process, on the ground that the unauthorized sale in this
Co., 148 App. Div. 871, 133 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1st Dep't, 1912) ; Kagan v. Avallone, 243 App.
Div. 437, 277 N. Y. Supp. 837 (1st Dep't, 1935).
1. A United States patent is "a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term
of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention or discovery
throughout the United States and the Territories thereof." 16 STArt. 201 (1870), 35 U.S. C. A.
§ 40 (1926).
2. 46 STAT. 703 (1930), 19 U. S. C. A. § 1337 (1934). Subsection (a) of the act reads:
"Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the
United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the
effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and
economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an
industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are hereby
declared unlawful. . . 2' And subsection (e) provides: "Whenever the existence of any
such unfair method or act shall be established to the satisfaction of the President he shal
direct that the articles concerned in such unfair methods or acts, shall be excluded from
entry into the United States...."
3. Frischer & Co., Inc. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. P. A. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U. S. 852 (1930); Comment (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 108.
4. Frischer & Co., Inc. v. Bakelite Corp., supra note 3, was distinguished as involving
only a product patent. The patent concerned, however, was ambiguous and had been
interpreted by the Tariff Commission as covering the process. The case of In re Northern
Pigment Co., 71 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. P. A. 1934), noted in (1934) 3 GEo. WSu. L. DInv. 224,
involving both product and process claims, was overruled insofar as it held that the importa-
tion of an unpatented product made by the unauthorized use of the process was unfair.
The section has been applied in only one other patent case. In re Orion Co., 71 F. (2d) 453
(C. C. P. A. 1934) (product claim).
5. In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F. (2d) 826 (C. C. P. A. 1935), Bland, J., di-enting.
Certiorari denied for want of jurisdiction under the Tariff Act, sub. nom. International
Agricultural Credit Corp. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., U. S. L. Week, Oct. 15, 1935, at 91.
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country of the former was a violation of the patent laws, and therefore their importa-
tion was unfair within the meaning of the Tariff Act, whereas the unauthorized sale
here of the latter was lawful under the patent laws, and therefore the importation of
such articles was not unfair under the Tariff Act.
Under the patent laws the courts have drawn a distinction between the extent
of the monopoly conferred by a product patent and that granted by a process patent.
Since a product patent grants the exclusive right to make, use and vend the patented
product, the sale of that product is an infringement. But a process patent grants
such right only as to the patented process, and consequently, the sale of the product
made by the infringing use of the process is not an infringement.0 In domestic com-
merce this rule is justified since the process patentee is amply protected by a right
of action against the infringing manufacturer,7 and to grant him an additional right
of action against each vendor would unnecessarily hamper trade8 and encourage multi-
plicity of actions. On the other hand, when the patented process is used in a foreign
country, and the resulting unpatented product imported, the patentee has no right
of action against the manufacturer who is beyond the territorial limits of this country,9
and he is unprotected unless permitted to bring an infringement action against the
importer or vendor of the product. To deny him this remedy, therefore, is to nullify
the value of his patent monopoly to the extent that products made by the foreign use
of the process are sold in the American market. The obvious effect is not only to
lessen the incentive to invention given by the patent laws, but also to promote the
secret use of new processes in those industries in which foreign competitors appear
likely to benefit from the disclosure of the process through registration of the patent. 10
An indirect result of the process patentee's lack of remedy is that those American
producers who are denied the use of the process are placed at a disadvantage in the
domestic as well as the foreign market, since they must compete with foreign manu-
facturers who enjoy the economic advantage of the improved process without cost.
They are thereby encouraged to evade the patent laws themselves simply by moving
their factories across the border and importing the product.11
Although the threat of loss to American process patentees from this source has not
been sufficient to evoke much agitation for patent law reform,' 2 nevertheless with the
6. Simpson v. Wilson, 44 U. S. 709 (1846); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568 (1876);
Goodyear v. N. J. Central Rr. Co., 10 Fed. Cas. 664 (C. C. N. J. 1853); see Barton v.
Nevada Consolidated Copper Co., 36 F. (2d) 85 (S. D. N. Y. 1929) and cases cited. But
cf. Fulton Co. v. Bishop & Babcock Co., 17 F. (2d) 1006 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927); Warner v.
Tennessee Products Corp., 57 F. (2d) 642 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932)
7. Welsbach Light Co. v. Union Incandescent Light Co., 101 Fed. 131 (C. C. A. 2d,
1900).
8. See Goodyear v. N. J. Central Rr. Co., 10 Fed. Cas. 664 at 668 (C. C. N. J. 1853).
9. "Infringement cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country."
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U. S. 641, 650 (1915) (patented
products sold in Canada); Bullock Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 129
Fed. 105 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904); Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works, 170 Fed.
188 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909); see Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Strauss, 171 Fed. 673, at
673 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909).
10. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U. S. 1, 19 (1829).
11. This occurred in In re Northern Pigment Co., 71 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. P. A. 1934) and
the court sustained the finding of the Tariff Commission that this was unfair within the
meaning of the Act. That case was expressly overruled as to this point by the decision In
the principal case.
. 12. See Report of the Committee on Patent Law Revision of the American Bar Asso-
ciation (1934) 16 3. PATENT OmcE SocI-ry 731, 736; Boyle, The Product of the Process
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development throughout the world of modem industrial technique, particularly in
those countries with low costs of production, this threat will tend to increase. A num-
ber of countries, particularly those so situated geographically as to be open to foreign
competition, have found it necessary to afford the process patentee protection by
extending the patent monopoly for a process to cover the product.'0 While in some
cases the American patentee may be able to protect himself by obtaining foreign patent
protection for his process, 14 nevertheless, particularly when the patentee is a small
manufacturer, the financial and technical difficulties of obtaining a foreign patent may
make this means of protection impracticable. 1" Again, in a few cases the American
patentee may be able to secure American patent protection for both his process and
its product, but this is usually unavailable since it will be granted only when both
the process and the product involve new discoveries.' 0 A third possibility is the ex-
tension of the patent laws by statutory amendment. Since the problem involves broad
questions of legislative policy, this latter method suggests itself as the most satisfactory
one.1 7 Presumably if this method were adopted, the process patentee would, under
the rationale of the instant case, be entitled to the additional remedy of exclusion
of the unpatented product under the Tariff Act. A fourth method of protecting the
process patent monopoly is by excluding the foreign-made product on the ground that
the unauthorized use of the patented process abroad and the importation of the product,
though lawful under the patent laws, is an unfair method of competition or unfair act
in the importation of articles under the Tariff Act.
In reaching its conclusion that the foreign use of the patented process and the
importation of the unpatented product did not come within the scope of the Act,
the court assumed that Congress, when it used the words "unfair methods of compe-
tition," intended them to have the same meaning in regard to competition between
domestic and foreign competitors as the same words, used in the Federal Trade
Commission Act, have had in relation to competition between domestic business men.IS
The test commonly applied under the latter Act has been whether or not the practices
involved were opposed to good morals, characterized by deception, or against public
(1933) 15 J. PATENT Or icE Soc vr 192. Presumably process patentees have been pro-
tected since 1930 under the decision in the Frisczer case, supra note 3.
13. The English courts, under a statute similar to the patent act in this country, hold
that the importation and sale in England of articles manufactured in another country by
a process patented in England is an infringement of the patent. Elmslie v. Boursier, L. R.
9 Eq. 217 (1869); Timr, PATErs (8th ed. 1934) 173. This holding was found necessary
to protect "the whole profit, benefit, commodity, and advantage" granted by the patent,
and authority supporting the United States rule was disregarded. See Hnmiimnx, PATErs
(1847) at 302; 14 SOL. J. 690 (1870). In the following countries also a patent for a process
extends to the product: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Japan, the Netherlands, and Poland. See L4DAs, THE INTmRNATioNAL PnoTEcrio.N or
IawusPz-AL PROPERTY, (1930) 244.
14. Report of Committee on Patent Law Revision of the American Bar Aszociation,
supra note 12, at 737; Brown, Is Patent Protection Abroad Advisabk? (1933) 15 J.
PATENT OrricE SocIETY 115; VAuGHN, EcoNo.,acs or OuR P,%T,"-r SYsTE,.. (1925) 245.
15. For the difficulties which existed prior to the establishment of the International Union
for the Protection of Industrial Property, see LADAs, op. cit. supra, note 13, at 31-32. And
for the efforts to remedy the problems and the present status, see LADAs, chs. 9-13.
16. See P. E. Sharpless Co. v. Crawford Farms, 287 Fed. 65 at 656 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
17. See Report of the Committee on Patent Law Revision of the American Bar A-ocia-
tion, supra note 12, at 736.
18. The Tariff Commission at first supported this view. See 6th Asa.uAL RuronT or
TH U. S. TAP= Comrassiox (1922) 4.
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policy as tending to create monopoly.' 9 The court felt that the importation and sale
of the phosphate under the circumstances of the instant case could not be included
within this test. Section 337, however, does not require such a limited interpretation,
for the words used are broader than those in the Federal Trade Commission Act,20
and could easily have been construed to cover the present practices. Furthermore,
the legislative history of the section indicates that Congress has approved its use to
protect the interests of process patentees. The present provision first appeared as
section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922, and under that Act the Tariff Commission made
its finding, upheld in the Frischer case,3 that the foreign use of the patented process
and the importation of the product was an unfair method of competition or unfair
act within the scope of the section. During the consideration of the Tariff Act of
1930, the Commission called the attention of the Ways and Means Committee of the
House to this finding and recommended that section 316 be reenacted as the sole pro-
tection available to process patentees under the law.21 When Congress reenacted
the section as section 337 of the 1930 Act it thereby presumably adopted the con-
struction placed on the wording by the Tariff Commission.22
ESTATE TAXATION OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO A GENERAL TESTAMENTARY POWER OF
APPOINTMENT
DONOR'S will gave donee a life estate, and a general testamentary power of appoint.
ment to dispose of the remainder in fee. It further provided that in default of donee's
exercise of her power, the remainder should go to designated remaindermen, After
donor's death, but before the exercise of the power by donee, the Federal Estate Tax
statute was enacted, section 302 (f) of which included in taxable gross estate all
property ". . . passing under a general power of appointment exercised by decedent."1
Donee exercised her power in favor of donor's remaindermen, who would have taken
had donee not exercised her power, but donor's remaindermen renounced the remainder
under donee's appointment and elected to succeed under the provisions of donor's will.
In refusing to uphold the tax commissioner's contention that the remainder was tax-
able as part of donees gross estate, the United States Supreme Court held that
since donor's remainderman had not been divested by donee, and in addition had
19. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920).
-20. The section declares unlawful not only "unfair methods of competition" but "unfair
acts in the importation." Furthermore, it seems broader in purpose than the Federal Trade
Commission Act, being directed at practices "the effect of which is to destroy or sub-
stantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States."
Supra note 2. The Senate Finance Committee, in reporting the section to the Senate, said:
"The provision relating to unfair methods of competition in the importation of goods Is
broad enough to prevent every type and form of unfair practice and is, therefore, a more
adequate protection to American industry than any anti-dumping statute the country ever
had." Sm. REP. No. 595,'67th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1922) 3.
21. Vol. 17, Supp. to Tariff Readjustment Reports on Tariff Bill of 1929, p. 10667.
22. See U. S. v. Bailey, 34 U. S. 238, 256 (1835); Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S. 144 (1924)
and cases cited. Unfortunately, the holding in the Frischer case was ambiguous, and the
majority of the court in the principal case felt that it did not concern process patents, but
only product patents.
1. Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, § 302(f), 44 STAT. 70, 26 U. S. C. A. § 1094(f) (1926),
26 U. S. C. A. § 411(f) (1935).
A general testamentary power of appointment is a general power under the statute. Whit-
lock-Rose v. McCaughn, 21 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927).
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elected to succeed from donor, the property did not "pass" from donee under the
exercise of her power.2
The Federal Estate Tax statute' and almost all the state inheritance tax statutes3
contain provisions for the taxation of property subject to a general power of appoint-
ment.4 Under these statutes, there seems to be little doubt that a transfer, taxable
as coming from donee, results when donee exercises his power in favor of his own
appointee, divesting donor's remainderman. The real point of controversy is that
involved in the principal case, namely, whether for purposes of succession taxation
the remainder shall be deemed to have been transferred from donor or from donee
when donee exercises his power of appointment in favor of donor's remainderman;
whether, in other words, the exercise of the power by donee should be considered a
superfluous act, or should be regarded as sufficiently instrumental in the transfer of
the property to warrant the imposition of a tax. This question is often raised under
the state inheritance tax statutes for the purpose of contesting the tax on the ground
that it is retroactive and therefore unconstitutional. For where the tax statute was
enacted after the death of the donor, a tax on donor's remainderman would be retro-
active if it is held that the remainder passed from donor and not from donee.0 Under
the Federal Estate Tax statute the question is not one of retroactivity but whether,
even if the donor's estate was taxed at donor's death, the property may be taxed
again to the estate of the donee at donee's death. For if the remainder is held to
have come from donor, there can be no tax to donees estate.7 Under both the state
and federal statutes the courts have split on the question whether a transfer from
the donee occurs in the case mentioned.
In state inheritance taxation, where the conflict originated, one group of states fol-
lows the New York rules which adheres to the common law doctrine that donor's
remainderman takes a vested remainder, subject to divestment, from donor. From
2. Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153 (1935), affg 70 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934),
rev'g 28 B. T. A. 1346 (1933).
3. For a collection of state statutes, see GLAsoN AND Oms, ImnmarrAl;cn TAxATo:. (4th
ed. 1925) 968 et seq.; Pmx=arox AN M LrSAps, INH=AicE Mm Es=%TE TAwms (1926)
531 et seq.
4. In the absence of specific statutory provision, there is no taxable transfer from done
under state inheritance tax statutes or the Federal Estate Tax Act, since it is the common
law rule that donee's appointee succeeds from donor and not from donee. Sucom:, Pov.'ns
(8th ed. 1861) 470; 4 K= Co=. (Text Book Series 1889) 337, 338. United States v.
Field, 255 U. S. 257 (1921); Emmons v. Shaw, 171 Mass. 410, 50 N. E. 1033 (1898).
5. Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278 (1901); Stratton v. United States, S0 F. (2d) 48 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 651 (1931).
6. Matter of Slosson, 216 N. Y. 79, 110 N. E. 166 (1915); Matter of Harbeck, 161 N. Y.
211, 55 N. E. 850 (1900) (before specific power of appointment provision was included in
the statute). See notes 8 and 9, infra.
7. United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257 (1921) ; Lederer v. Pearce, 266 Fed. 497 (C. C. A.
3d, 1920). Both decisions were rendered before specific power of appointment provision was
included in the federal statute. See note 13, ifra.
8. Matter of Lansing, 182 N. Y. 23S, 74 N. E. 882 (1905). Despite a broadly worded
statute which provided that a taxable transfer occurred from donee whether he exerck'd
his power or not, the New York Court of Appeals refused to permit a tax to donor's remain-
derman either when donee specifically appointed him, or allowed the remainder to pass to
him by a non-exercise of his power of appointment. Id. at 248, 249, 74 N. E. at 885. The
statute was later changed to permit a tax only when donee exercised his power. New York
Sess. Laws, 1911, c. 732. For the interpretation given this amended statute, see GLrxsoN;
AuD Ows, op. cit. supra note 3, at 351.
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this premise, it follows that donee's exercise of his power in favor of donor's remainder-
man is an ineffectual attempt to transfer to donor's remainderman an estate which
he already possesses. Thus an inheritance tax upon donor's remainderman for an
estate which was transferred to him by donor's will before a taxing statute was en-
acted is retroactive and unconstitutional. Another group of states follows the Massa-
chusetts rule' 0 which holds, contrary to the common law doctrine, that the succes-
sion to the remainder is held in abeyance until donee's death. From this premise it
is reasoned that donee is an intermediate step in the devolution of the remainder,
so that either an exercise or a non-exercise of his power may transfer the remainder
to donor's remainderman. Since this transfer occurred after the tax statute was en-
acted, an inheritance tax to donor's remainderman may be validly imposed." An
identical split of authority occurred in the lower federal courts, up to the time of the
instant Supreme Court decision, turning upon the interpretation of the ambiguous
clause in question in the Federal Estate Tax Act.' 2 One group of courts followed
the New York rationale and refused to impose a tax upon donee's estate for the value
of the remainder when donee appointed donor's remainderman;13 another group in
effect followed the Massachusetts doctrine and taxed donee's estate because donee
transferred "economic benefits."' 4 In settling the conflict in the federal courts, the
principal case expressly adopts the New York "vested remainder" rationale with its
consequence that the original transfer by donor must be set aside by donee before a
taxable transfer could result from donee under his power. Although it recognized
9. Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, and Mississippi have adopted statutes similar to the amended
New York statute. California, Illinois, Kentucky, and Kansas have enacted the original
broad statute, but the courts follow the New York rule. In re Murphy's Estate, 182 Cal.
740, 190 Pac. 46 (1920); State of Kansas v. United States Trust Co. of New York, 99 Kan.
841, 163 Pac. 156 (1917); see Winn v. Schenck, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 615, 617, 110 S. W. 827, 828
(1908); Bentley, Inheritance Taxation of Powers of Appointment (1929) 23 ILL. L. Rv.
446, 458.
10. Minot v. Stevens, 207 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236 (1911). The
Supreme Judicial Court held its statute constitutional which provided for a taxable trans-
fer from donee whether he exercised his power of appointment or not.
11. A majority of the states have adopted this liberal statute, and Minnesota and Wis-
consin have adopted the Massachusetts rationale in interpreting it. State v. Mary Brooks,
181 Minn. 262, 232 N. W. 331 (1930); Montague v. State, 163 Wis. 58, 157 N. W. 508 (1916).
For the Pennsylvania interpretation, see GLEAso AND (O)Ts, op. cit. supra note 3, at 347.
12. The word "passing" in that clause is left open to judicial determination. The
present split of interpretation has its source in the ambiguous provision of the Estate Tax
Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 777, § 202a, which included in taxable gross estate all property in which
decedent had an "interest." The federal courts felt themselves bound by the state court
determinations as to whether a power of appointment was an interest in property. See
Lederer v. Pearce, 266 Fed. 497, 499 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920). With the adoption of the more
specific provisions of § 402(e) of the 1919 Act and § 302(f) of the 1924 Act, the federal
courts made an independent interpretation, and abandoned the conflicting state deter-
minations. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 34 F. (2d) 600, 602, 603 (C. C.
A. 3rd, 1929). The original rationales, however, were carried over.
13. Grinnell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 70 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934);
Union and Peoples National Bank of Jackson, 30 B. T. A. 1277 (1934); Estate of Helen M.
W. Grant, 13 B. T. A. 174 (1928).
14. Lee v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 57 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C. 1932), cert,
denied, 286 U. S. 563 (1932); Wear v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 65 F. (2d) 665
(C. C. A. 3d, 1933); Camden Safe Deposit and Trust Company, 30 B. T. A. 287 (1934).
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that some "benefits" might have been shifted, it denied that they "passed" under the
exercise of donee's power. 15
Though the court was justified in interpreting the power of appointment provision
in the Federal Estate Tax statute as if the common law rules of vesting of future
estates should govern, it is clear that it could have allowed the tax in this case with-
out any strain of language.16 In fact, allowing the tax would have been more con-
sistent with the court's utterances upon similar problems involving the question
whether a taxable transfer occurs where there has been a non-exercise, rather than
an exercise of power. Thus when a settlor releases his entire interest in property by
an inter vivos transfer, but retains the bare power to change the beneficiary, a tax-
able transfer occurs at the settlor's death, whether he exercises his power or not,
and the property is included in his gross estate subject to the federal estate tax. T The
same result has been reached in insurance cases where the insured retains the power
to change his beneficiary but never exercises it.18 These holdings are based upon
the theory that the destruction of the power of control at death bestows an "economic
benefit" upon the beneficiary which he did not have before.10 This "economic bene-
fit" theory is equally applicable to the instant case,20 for the relationship of donee and
donor's remaindermen logically cannot be distinguished from that of settlor, or in-
15. See Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 156, 157 (1935).
16. An early Treasury Regulation interpreting the instant provision in the Federal Estate
Tax Act required that a tax be imposed on donees estate irrespective of whether or not
donee exercised his power of appointment. U. S. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 24. This was subSe-
quently changed. U. S. Treas. Reg. 70 (1929 ed.), Art. 24.
17. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U. S. 339 (1929); Helvering v. City
Bank and Farmers' Trust Company, 74 F. (2d) 242 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. granted
55 Sup. Ct. 655 (1935). See ROBMNSOw, S.m o TA.as =x Dmurrx WxLLs Aim Tnusms
(2d ed. 1933) 204 et seq.
18. Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 63 A. L. R. 388 (1929). An
additional element of control obtains in the insurance cases: insured may fail to pay his
premiums and thus defeat his beneficiary. This factor does not appear to have been con-
sidered. A situation almost identical with the settlor cases would be a fully paid-up insur-
ance policy, or an irrevocable trust set up to pay the premiums, with a power of control over
the beneficiary reserved. See Comment (1935) 44 Yr L. J. 1409, 1415 et seq.; see al-o
Oppenheimer, Proceeds of Life Insurance Policies Under the Federal Estate Tax (1930) 43
HAxv. L. Rav. 724.
19. See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 678 (1933); Crooks v. Loose, 36 F. (2d) 571, 573
(C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ; (1935) 44 YAr. L. 3. 1245, 1247. This "economic benefit" theory has
been used in other instances, even where there was no active power of control, to permit a
succession tax upon vested interests which were subject to investment. Tyler v. United States
281 U. S. 497 (1930); Phillips v. Dime Trust and Safe Deposit Co., 284 U. S. 160 (1933);
Mloffit v. Kelly, 218 U. S. 400 (1910).
An analysis of the "economic benefits" which accrue to donor's remainderman yields the
following: Donor's remainderman has a "right" to the remainder subject to a "lhability" to
divestment, because of donees power of appointment or control. It is not until donees
death that this "liability" may be changed to an "immunity" to divestment , which is just
as much a legal incident of ownership as is the "right.' This change occurs 'whether donee
exercises his power affirmatively in favor of donor's remainderman, or does not exercize
it at all. For an analysis of the general problem, see Simes, The Devolution of Title to
Appointed Property (1928) 22 IL. L. RE. 480.
20. See Lee v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 57 F. .(2d) 399, 402 (App. D. C.
1932); Wear v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 65 F. (2d) 665, 667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
These two cases have been overruled by the principal case.
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sured, and beneficiary. In both cases, assuming the common law rule, a transfer of a
vested interest, subject to divestment was made, and a bare power to change the
beneficiary reserved. The fact that in the principal case the power was given to a
donee, while in the others it was reserved by the settlor or insured is irrelevant. 21
Under the "economic benefit" theory, therefore, the remainder subject to donee's
power of appointment might have been included in donee's taxable gross estate
whether she specifically appointed donor's remaindermen or merely refrained from
divesting them.22
It may be conceded that the language of the Federal Estate Tax Act, if strictly
construed, would not justify a tax upon donee's estate in the absence of an affirmative
exercise by donee of her power of appointment.2 3 But the court might well have
ruled oppositely in the instant case, since the donee affirmatively exercised her power
in favor of donor's remainderman and complied with the language of the statute.
NEGOTIABILITY OF BONDS OF A MASSACHUSETTS TRuST
EVER since the Negotiable Instruments Law made form rather than function the
test of negotiability, the application of that Act to long-term commercial paper has
been a source of discontent. It is pointed out that bonds, debentures, and like instru-
ments differ from bills and notes in a great many respects, and that the technical
requirements of the statute have seriously limited the possibilities of inventing new
types of negotiable instruments to meet the requirements of a rapidly changing
financial world.' For instance, despite commercial usage, interim certificates were
held to be non-negotiable because not payable in money.2 In other cases mortgage
provisions and certain kinds of references to the mortgage indenture have been held
to make the promise in a bond conditional, thereby destroying its negotiability.3
There have been similar holdings with respect to equipment trust certificates 4 and
21. See Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 271 (1928).
The analogy of the settlor and insurance cases might be held inapplicable to the Instant
case upon the ground that the former two lines of cases had nothing to do with interpre-
tation, but merely with the constitutionality of the federal estate tax provisions which pro-
vide for a tax in those specific instances. The same "economic benefit" rationale which
was used in upholding constitutionality might equally as well have been used in the inter-
pretation of the power of appointment provision of the Federal Estate Tax Act.
22. By the authority of the settlor and insurance cases, the "immunity" from divest-
ment is transferred under the power, whether the power is exercised or not. The passage of
this "immunity" is a sufficient basis to impose a tax upon the entire remainder. See Tyler- v.
United States, 281 U. S. 497, 502, 503 (1930) ; (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1245, 1247, n. 19.
23. The Act provides that the power of appointment must be "exercised."
1. See Steffen and Russell, The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds (1932) 41 YALE L. 3.
799, citing other articles; II MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1908) § 1740A.
Cases on the application of the N. I. L. to bonds are collected in SMUT AND Moonu,.
CASES ON Bn~rs AND NoTEs (3d ed. 1932) 1, n.
The Commercial Acts Section of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has recommended amendments to the N. I. L. which would allow instruments
to become negotiable through usage. HANDBOOX OF TlE NATIONAL Co 'ERENCE 0r CoM-
%IssIoxFRs ON UNmuOaim STATE LAWS AND PRoczEINGs (1933) 150.
2. Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594 (1926).
3. King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481, 199 N. W. 437 (1924); St. Louis-Carter-
vilie Coal Co. v. Southern Coal & Mining Co., 194 Mo. App. 598, 186 S. W. 1152 (1916).
4. Fidelity and Deposit Company v. Andrews, 244 Mich. 159, 221 N. W, 114 (1928).
municipal assessment bonds.0 The question whether technical objections prevent
the negotiability of the instruments of unincorporated associations is unsettled.0
While New York has decided that the bonds of a joint stock company are negotia-
ble,7 this question with respect to the bonds of a Massachusetts trust was decided
for the first time in a recent case. Replevin was brought to recover stolen deben-
tures issued by the International Hydroelectric System, a voluntary association
organized under the laws of Massachusetts. The instruments bore the statement
that neither trustees nor shareholders assumed any personal liability. The court held
for the plaintiff on the ground that since a Massachusetts voluntary association is
not a legal person, the promise to pay was the promise of the trustees, and since the
latter had agreed only to pay out of the assets held in trust, there was no uncondi-
tional promise within the meaning of Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.8
While the rationale of the instant case is justified by the rules of the common law
and law merchant,9 there is reason to believe that Section 191 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, defining "person" as including "a body of persons whether incor-
porated or not", was intended to endow business trusts with legal personality for the
purpose of issuing negotiable instruments, and thus to change the former common
law status of business trusts in this respect.O This view is supported by the inter-
pretation given by the courts to Section 20, which provides: "Where the instrument
contains or the person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on
behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instru-
ment if he was duly authorized." A number of cases have held that this section
applies to relieve from personal liability a party who has signed a promissory note
as trustee without inserting in the note any provision for limited liability." The
only basis upon which these decisions could have been reached is that the trustee
was a representative signing on behalf of a disclosed principal, so that the trust
estate and not the trustee was the promisor. While the liability of a trustee when
limited to the extent of a particular fund would not be sufficient to satisfy the
statutory requirement of unconditional liability of the promisor, ' nevertheless, when
the fund itself becomes the promisor, the requirement is met, the fund being unlim-
5. Manker v. American Savings Bank & Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 Pac. 406 (1924).
6. See Steffen, A Proposed Uniform Act aking Inveslment Inslruments Negotiable
(1934) 34 CoL. L. Rav. 632; HsAmBoom O r = NATIoNAL CoNzarz CM or Co ssion-
Ers ox Ummrmoa STATE LAws AND Pno DNmcs (1933) 155. The Committee on Amend-
ments to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act proposes to end the uncertainty by
special recognition in the Act that unincorporated associations may isue negotiable Instru-
merits.
7. Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108 (1907).
8. Lorimer v. McGreevy, 84 S. W. (2d) 667 (Kansas City Ct. of App., 1935), cert.
denied, Mo. Sup. Ct. July 30, 1935, sub. nor. State ex rel. McGreevy v. Shain, J.
9. Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 330 (1884); Larson v. Sylvester, 282 Mfas. 352, 185 N. E.
44 (1933); SEARs, TRUsT ESTATES AS BusInzss Coimn'.ms (2d ed. 1921) §§ 32-34;
WaxrnrGoro,, UNrmcoRPORATEo AssocIArroNs AmD Busnrms Tnusrs (2d. ed. 1923) 224.
10. See BAzmA, Nk.ormz~nr INsumx=s LAw (5th ed. 1932) 272; Note (1930)
5 TuL=A L. REv. 135.
11. Hawthorne v. Austin Organ Co., 71 F. (2d) 945 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Charles
Nelson Co. v. Morton, 106 Cal. App. 144, 288 Pac. 845 (1930); Baker v. James, 280 Mm.
43, 181 N. E. 861 (1932); Mlegowan v. Peterson, 173 N. Y. 1, 69 N. E. 738 (1902);
RESTATmarENT, Tausrs (Tent. Draft, 1933) § 255, Comment (e). But d. Vorachek v.
Anderson, 54 N. D. 891, 211 N. W. 984 (1927) (N. I. L. not mentioned).
12. DAm., NaoOnABr. Itsraummim (6th ed. 1913) § 271; T =rmxAN, Coiamcr
PAER (1889) § 145.
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itedly liable as an entity in the same manner that funds of a corporation may be
liable for purposes of the Negotiable Instruments Law.18
There is nothing really novel in this conclusion, for the common law concept that
a trust is not a legal person has already been abandoned for a number of other
purposes. Statutes now permit voluntary associations and trusts to sue and be
sued in their own names.14 They are entities for the purposes of taxation18 and
bankruptcy.' 6 They are included within the definition of a corporation in many
states, and are regulated like corporations.17 The United States Supreme Court
has ruled that a Massachusetts voluntary association is a unit sufficiently distinct
from its trustees so that it cannot claim the benefits assured to the latter by the privi-
leges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution, and thus
may be excluded from a state as a foreign corporation.18 From any other than the
legal point of view a business trust is unquestionably an entity, quite as much so as
a corporation.' 9 Voluntary associations and trust estates function as business units,
and there seems to be no good reason why their obligations, which perform all
the functions of negotiable instruments, and which business men have treated as
negotiable, should not be so regarded by the courts. Although custom does not
prevail over legislation, a construction of the Negotiable Instruments Law which
is incompatible with business usage is undesirable, and should not be followed in
preference to an alternative view which is compatible with established legal princi-
ples.
ESTOPPEL OF TAXPAYER TO SET UP STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHERE GOVERNMENT
Is LED TO DEFER TAX ASSESSMENT By TAXPAYER'S MISREPRESENTATION Or LAW
EXECUTRiX desired to pay herself commission for services to the estate and to have
the commission deducted in the computation of estate taxes. The amount of cash in
the estate being insufficient, executrix lent it funds, taking back a note therefor, and
thereafter paid herself the commission out of the funds lent. Although not including
the commission in her income tax return of that year, she mentioned the transaction
in a footnote, claiming that in accordance with the ruling by the Solicitor of Internal
Revenue in an analogous case,1 the commission was not taxable until it had been
approved by the probate court. The district revenue agent at first rejected her claim,
but after a conference, agreed to the executrix's interpretation, and accepted her
return, anticipating the taxation of the commission when the court had approved it.
Five years later the probate court approved the commission, and the revenue depart-
13. See BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 775; WARREN, CoaRoRAm ADVANTAGES
wrrHour INCORPORATION (1929) 864. Although the court in the instant case stated that
it was greatly influenced by Professor Warren's attack upon the decision in Hibbs v.
Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108 (1907), which held the bonds of a joint-stock com-
pany to be negotiable, (WARR N, op. cit. supra 477-500) it apparently failed to notice
that the closing paragraph of this treatise supports the opposing view.
14. MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 182, § 6; cf. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal
Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
15. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S. 144 (1924).
16. Gallagher v. Hannigan, 5 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925).
17. Reilly v. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35, 40 A. L. R. 1005 (1925).
18. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537 (1928).
19, See Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions (1924) 33 YALe:
L. J. 383; Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations (1929) 42 HARV. L.
REV. 977.
1. S. M. 1929, IV-1 Cum. Bull. 125.
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ment then endeavored to tax it. Executrix, reversing her former position, now
claimed that the commission was properly taxable in the earlier year, and that inas-
much as the Statute of Limitations had run as to tax claims for that year, the tax
was uncollectible. The Board of Tax Appeals acquiesced in this defense, holding
that inasmuch as the taxpayer's misrepresentation was one of law rather than of
fact, the government could not invoke an estoppel against the taxpayer's denial of
present taxability.2
The purpose of the Federal Statute of Limitations3 as to tax claims is to prevent
the taxpayer from being subjected to belated assessments which, being unexpected,
may prove unduly burdensome. But since to preclude the government from collecting
any income tax because of the running of the Statute of Limitations is to discriminate
against those taxpayers who are taxed, it would seem desirable that the statute be
allowed as a defense only in those instances where its purpose would be directly
subserved. Thus, where the negligence of the tax unit is the sole reason for income
not being taxed in a year now beyond the period of statutory limitation, it seems clear
that such income should go untaxed in order to protect the taxpayer against unfore-
seeable liability not due to his own negligence or fraud.4 This is true even
where the taxpayer innocently makes an improper return, if at the scame time
he includes in his return sufficient facts to put the tax authorities on reasonable
notice of the error, and those authorities negligently fail to correct the return before
the statute has run.5
But where the taxpayer, although acting innocently, omits to include or misrepre-
sents a fact which would alter his liability, and the tax authorities are not put on
notice of the fact by the return, it would seem that, since the subsequent burdens
placed on the taxpayer are virtually self-imposed, the taxpayer ought to be prevented
from benefiting by the statute even though the factors of unexpectedness and conse-
quent undue hardship of the tax assessment are present. In such cases it has been
held that income may be taxed in the improper year, on the ground of equitable
estoppel against the taxpayer.0 And certainly where the taxpayer purposely makes an
incorrect return with the intent of escaping that liability, it is obvious that the
statute should not run against the government, since the purpose of the statute is
solely to protect innocent taxpayers against unexpected tax assessments. In fact, the
statute specifically exempts this last situation from its application.7
Finally, where, as in the principal case, the taxpayer represents as a matter of
law that a portion of his income is taxable in a later year, and the government ac-
quiesces in that claim, it would seem that the purpose of the statute is lost sight of,
if, after the running of the period of limitations, the taxpayer is allowed to show
2. Richard AT. Cadwalader, Jr., 32 B. T. A., Aug. 8, 1935.
3. 48 STAT. 745, 26 U. S. C. A. § 275 (1934).
4. Essex Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930); United States
v. S. F. Scott and Sons, Inc., 69 F. (2d) 728 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
5. Cf. Hamilton Web. Co. v. Page, 8 F. Supp. 626, 633 (D. R. I., 1934); see A. M1.
Johnson, 32 B. T. A. Feb. 26, 1935. The taxpayer usually is enabled to take advantage of
the statute when the commissioner was warned of the error before the statute had tolled.
See Helvering v. Brooklyn City Rr. Co., 72 F. (2d) 274, 276 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Union
Pacific Rr. Co., 32 B. T. A., April 16, 1935, at 10.
6. Commissioner v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932);
Stem Bros. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 705 (Ct. Cl., 1934); 2 Po=roy, EQurr Juras-
PRuDECE (4th ed. 1918) § 805; see Maguire and Zimet, Hobsor's Choice and Similar Frac-
ies in Federal Taxation (1935) 48 HARv. L. RPv. 1281, 1295.
7. 48 STAT. 745, 26 U. S. C. A. § 276(a) (1934); see Bert AT. Wuliger, 16 B. T. A. 1220,
1225 (1929).
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that the income was taxable in an earlier year and that assessment on it is now
barred. For in such a case, if the taxpayer is acting in good faith, he intends to
pay the tax in a subsequent year. Consequently he can make appropriate provision
for its payment at that time, and the evils which may be attendant upon an unex-
pected and belated assessment, and which the statute is intended to prevent, cannot
arise. If, on the other hand, the taxpayer has no intention of paying the tax, desiring
merely to delay its assessment until it should be barred by the Statute of Limitations,
he would seem to fall directly within that exception to the statute which denies the
statute's protection to taxpayers fraudulently or intentionally endeavoring to evade
income taxation.
7
This result is the rule where the taxpayer and the commissioner agree upon a
definite way of handling a situation, and it subsequently transpires that their interpre-
tation was erroneous.8 The taxpayer is held to his agreement and kept from showing
the incorrectness of the mutual interpretation when the government taxes in accord-
ance with that interpretation. Such an agreement need not be formal, but is usually
implied in fact.9 In the instant case, such an informal agreement appears to have
been made, for, previous to the final acceptance of the tax return by the tax unit,
the parties had discussed methods of taxing the executrix's commission, and it was
finally decided that the commission should not be taxed until approved by the court.
But even if it be held that the elements of an agreement are lacking, still the
taxpayer should be held liable for the taxes. Estoppel is denied for a misrepresen-
tation of law' 0 only because, all men being presumed to know the law, it is supposedly
prima facie negligence to be misled by such a misrepresentation. But the present
uncertainty in the tax law makes so theoretical an assumption utterly inappropriate
for the practical problem of collecting revenue."1 If the taxpayer gained, as he had
8. Backus et al. v. United States, 59 F. (2d) 242, 257 (Ct. Cl., 1932) ; see Ralston Purina
Co. v. United States, 58 F. (2d) 1065, 1068 (Ct. Cl., 1932); Reynolds v. Gnichtel, 1 V.
Supp. 606, 608 (D. N. J., 1932); Maguire and Zimet, suPra note 6, at 1326. But generally
the courts ignore the contractual aspect, reaching the same conclusion by various equitable
approaches such as election, acceptance of benefits under previous error, or waiver of an
inconsistent right. CL R. H. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U. S. 54 (1934); Hartwell
Mills v. Rose, 61 F. (2d) 441, 444 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); Moran v. Commissioner, 67 F. (2d)
601 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933); Wheelock et ux. v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 5th,
1935); Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co. v. United States, 2 F. Supp, 126 (Ct. Cl., 1933);
Mahoning Investment Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 622 (Ct. Cl., 1933); Raleigh v.
United States, 9 F. Supp. 622 (Ct. CI., 1934); Stevens Mfg. Co. v. United States, 8 ri.
Supp. 720 (Ct. CI., 1934); Giant Furniture Co. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 585 (Ct. CI,
1935); Louis Werner Saw Mill Co., 26 B. T. A. 141 (1932); J. 0. W. Gravely, 29 B. T. A.
29 (1933), Firemen's Ins. Co., 30 B. T. A. 1004 (1934).
9. Ralston Purina Co. v. United States, 58 F. (2d) 1065, 1068 (Ct. Cl., 1932).
10. In many cases where estoppel is denied on the grounds that the misrepresentation Is
one of law, a careful analysis would seem to indicate that while the taxpayer's original
error was one of law, the actual misrepresentation was one of fact, being the filhg of a
return which failed to mention at all the item of income in dispute. See Salvage v.
Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. granted, U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. 14,
1935; Jamieson v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 321 (D. Mass., 1935); Union Pacific Rr. Co.,
32 B. T. A., April 16, 1935. Estoppel has been allowed in similar cases. See Crane v.
Commissioner, 68 F. (2d) 640 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934); Bothwell v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d)
35 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935); Adler v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
11. See Tide Water Oil Co., 29 B. T. A. 1208, 1218 (1934). Where the conclusion
reached by denying estoppel against the taxpayer seems justifiable, it is usually because
of the presence of obvious negligence on the part of the commissioner. See The Sugar Creek
expected, a deferral of his tax to a subsequent year, whether it was by a misrepresen-
tation of fact or law, the injuries which the statute is intended to avert cannot fall
on him, and he should not be granted tax exemption.1-
RENT PAID BY LESSEE TO LESSOR'S STocxHoLDERS As INComE TAXABLE To LEssozl
IN 1881 the lessor corporation leased all its property to the lessee corporation for
ninety-nine years, the lessee agreeing to maintain the property in good repair and to
pay all taxes levied on the property in addition to an annual sum to the lessor to
enable it to meet its corporate expenses. The lessee further agreed to pay a fixed
rental directly to the lessor's bondholders and stockholders and, in pursuance of this
agreement, executed its separate contract with each stockholder and bondholder
upon his stock or bond certificate. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
attempted to include the payments to the bondholders and stockholders in the lessor's
income' on the ground that the payments to the bondholders discharged a debt of
the lessor to its creditors and that the payments to the stockholders should be
treated as a distribution by the lessor of dividends. The Federal District Court
for the District of Connecticut sustained the Commissioner's position with respect to
the payments to bondholders. But it denied his contention that the payments
to the lessor's stockholders were dividends, on the ground that the payments had
never been due the lessor, but were a debt due by the lessee to the lessor's stock-
holders as donee-beneficiaries under the contract of lease.2 In reaching this result,
the court in effect overruled the previous federal rule.a
Coal and Mining Co., 31 B. T. A., Oct. 16, 1934; Hamilton Web Co. v. Page, 8 F. Supp.
626 (D. R. I., 1934); Union Pacific Rr. Co., 32 B. T. A. April 16, 1935.
12. Similar reasoning would seem to refute the validity of the present denial of estoppel
for false expressions of opinion by the taxpayer. Summerfield Co., 29 B. T. A. 77 (1933);
May Rogers, 31 B. T. A., Jan. 9, 1935; Northport Shores, Inc., 31 B. T. A. Jan. 15, 1935.
Admittedly the commissioner must be held to a high standard of care in accepting opinions,
but there are certain situations in which he should be held justified In relying on them.
1. 48 STAT. 686 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 22 (1935); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S.
189, 207 (1920) (income defined); see (1933) 28 Ian. L. Rxv. 572.
2. United States v. Northwestern Telegraph Co., 10 F. Supp. 703 (D. Conn. 1935).
The government will appeal. 353 CCH Federal Tax Service p. 9061.
3. Anderson v. Morris & Essex Rr. Co., 216 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) (ConroAmz
TAX AcT of 1909, 36 STAT. 112); Blalock v. Georgia Ry. & Electric Co., 246 Fed. 387
(C. C. A. 5th, 1917) (same); West End St. Ry. Co. v. Malley, 246 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 1st,
1917) (one judge dissenting), cert. denied, 246 U. S. 671 (1918); Rensselaer & Saratoga
Rr. Co. v. Irwin, 249 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) (one judge d issenting), cert. denied,
246 U. S. 671 (1918); Northern Ry. Co. of New Jersey v. Lowe, 250 Fed. 856 (C. C. A.
2d, 1918); American Telegraph & Cable Co. v. United States, 61 Ct. CL 326 (1925),
cert. denied, 271 U. S. 660 (1926); 351 CCH Federal Tax Service U 85.02 (collection of
Treasury and Board of Tax Appeals rulings). Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 716 (1929) (payment by employer of employee's income tax
held additional taxable income to employee); United States v. Boston & Maine Rr. Co.,
279 U. S. 732 (1929) (payment by lessee corporation of lessor corporation's income and
property taxes held additional taxable income to lessor). Contra: Northwestem Tele-
graph Co. v. Tax Comm., 212 Wis. 219, 248 N. W. 164 (1933), noted in (1933) 28 Irt.
L. Rxv. 572, and in (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 303. The instant case also overrules
a long series of Treasury Regulations. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 70 (1934). Earlier
regulations to the same effect were expressly approved in United States v. Boston & Maine
Rr. Co., supra. By the enactment of a statute which has received an executive interpre-
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The reasoning of the court seems to accord with that of the numerous cases of
assignment, generally from husband to wife, to avoid income taxation. The rationale
of these cases is vague,4 aside from there being a general minimum requirement that
an assignment, in order to transfer the tax liability' to the assignee, must be irrevoca-
ble. In addition, the courts attempt to distinguish between assignments of "prop-
erty rights" and assignments of mere income, holding that the former operate to
transfer tax liability to the assignee, but that the latter have no such effect. Although
the obvious difficulty of defining "property rights" necessitates a treatment of each
case on its particular facts, rents have been considered "property rights" within
the meaning of the rule.5 Consequently, if these assignment cases be assimilated to
those involving third party beneficiaries, 6 the promisee in the instant case would
seem to be exempt from taxation, for the beneficiary has a right to the payment of
rent, the irrevocable nature of which is demonstrated by the fact that the lessor
can neither require the lessee to pay the rent to itself nor otherwise impair its
shar+eholders' rights, once they have become vested,1 without their consent.8
However, these analogies, taken primarily from cases of assignment between
husband and wife to escape income taxation, become less persuasive in a case involv-
ing a corporation and its stockholders, where their application would result in the
privileges of the corporate form being enjoyed without payment of the taxes pre-
scribed therefor.9 It is obvious in the instant case that the stockholders' rights to
the rentals derive from their status as members of the corporation, disappearing
when, by a transfer of their stock, they leave the corporation, and that the rent is
paid for the use of the property of the corporation.' 0 Furthermore, not only is the
tation, where the interpretation has been generally acquiesced in by the courts, the exccu-
tive becomes the legislative interpretation. See McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283
U. S. 488, 492 (1931).
The older rule holding the lessor liable had already been emasculated by decisions which
in effect denied the government any means of collecting the tax. See notes 14, 16, injra.
The instant case denied the existence of even the theoretical tax liability of the lemor.
4. See Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1123; Harwood v. Eaton, 68 F. (2d) 12, 14
(C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (Hand, J., concurring).
5. See Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443, 444 (App. D. C. 1931); cf. United States v.
Looney, 29 F. (2d) 884 (C. C. A. Sth, 1929) (royalties); Nelson v. Ferguson, 56 F.
(2d) 121 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932) (same). Contra: Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930)
(attorney's fees); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136 (1932) (partnership income); Van
Meter v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 61 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) (insurance
commissions on renewals).
6. The only difference analytically is that an assignment requires a pre-existing right
due the assignor, whereas in the case of a third party beneficiary contract the right is
created in the same instrument in which it is transferred. The only difference in result-
ing jural relations is that the promisee in the latter case has an equitable right of action
against the promisor for specific performance of his promise to the beneficiary, while the
assignor completely surrenders all his rights, remedial as well as primary.
7. The right of a donee-beneficiary, unlike that of a creditor-beneficiary, becomes
indefeasible immediately upon the formation of the contract. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) § 136, com. (a).
8. Bowers v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 121 Misc. 250, 201 N. Y. Supp. 198
(Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd without opinion, 208 App. Div. 768, 202 N. Y. Supp. 917 (1st Dep't
1924); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs (1932) § 142.
9. 48 STAT. 686 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1935); P. L. No. 407, 74th Cong,, 1st
Sess. (1935) § 102.
10. See West End Street Ry. Co. v. Malley, 246 Fed. 625, 626 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917);
Harwood v. Eaton, 68 F. (2d) 12, 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (Hand, J., concurring).
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corporate form a vital factor in the arrangement, but, since the entire net capital
of the lessor remains unimpaired in the hands of the lessee 1 and the lessor cor-
poration has no expenses whatever, the rent paid its stockholders for the use of
its capital is tantamount to surplus derived therefrom, all of which is distributable.
Therefore, just as a corporation is deemed to be enjoying a very real taxable income
in the case of rentals paid by the lessee directly to the lessor's bondholders in dis-
charge of the lessor's debts, 2 so, also, payments made directly to stockholders should
be treated as a distribution of dividends and consequently as income of the corpora-
tion for purposes of taxation.13 Both cases are similarly unique and both should
be accorded exceptional treatment without any confusion of the issue by analogies
drawn from the ordinary principles of third party beneficiary or of assignment.
There are admittedly practical difficulties in the way of collecting the lessors tax.
It has been held that, even if the lessor is liable to pay the tax, the government
cannot recover the corporate tax from the shareholders, whether they be considered
simply shareholders or "transferees" under the Revenue Act.14 Furthermore, no
obligation to pay the income tax of a lessor rests on the lessee;'r nor can the gov-
ernment, under the lien statute, impress a lien on the funds in the hands of the
lessee and restrain payments to the shareholders.' ° The only remedy thus left the
government is the ordinary procedure of distraint and -ale against the corporation's
11. If the lessor had to take care of depredation, so much of the rent as would
ordinarily be required to meet such charges would appear to be a capital distribution
to shareholders.
12. Corporations have been held to owe their stockholders an equitable duty to
declare dividends under certain circumstances. Reynolds v. Diamond Mlills Pap2r Co.,
69 N. J. Eq. 299, 60 Atl. 941 (1905); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170
N. W. 668 (1919). To the-extent, therefore, that the stockholders surrender their con-
tingent rights to future dividends if earned, they may be considered creditor-beneficiaries
rather than donees. But it is quite true that they are not creditors in the sense that
bondholders are. American-Steel Foundries v. Lazear, 204 Fed. 204 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913);
Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914).
13. Some courts in situations like this stress the necessity of disregarding the lessor's
corporate entity entirely and simply regarding the payments to stockholders as payments
to their corporation. See Harwood v. Eaton, 6S F. (2d) 12, 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933)
(Hand, J., concurring); Finkelstein, The Corporate Entity and the Income Tax (1934)
44 YALxE L. J. 436; Comment (1932) 80 U. op PA. L. Rtv. 892; cf. Sherman, Taxation
of Corporations Used to Avoid Taxes Upon Stockholders (1935) 13 TAx I. 19, 78.
The holding of the instant court presents a possible scheme for future circumvention
of the corporate income tax. For example, a corporation might lease its property to a
subsidiary organized for the purpose at a rental to be paid directly to the shareholders
of the parent corporation and fixed at such a high rate as to preclude any profit to the
lessee. Since the rent would be deductible from the lessee's income as a businez3 expensc,
48 STAT. 688 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 23 (1935), neither corporation would pay a tax
and the only taxable income would be the payments to the stockholders of the lessor
assessed against them individually.
14. 48 STAT. 748 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 311 (1935); Harwood v. Eaton, 6S F. (2d)
12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 636 (1934); Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 68 F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 292
U. S. 636 (1934).
15. Sharon Ry. Co. v. Erie Rr. Co., 268 Pa. 396, 112 At]. 242 (1920); Brainard v.
New York Central Rr. Co., 242 N. Y. 125, 151 N. E. 152 (1926).
16. 45 STAT. 875 (1928), 48 STAT. 757 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 1560-1567 (1935);
United States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 50 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), cert.
denied, 292 U. S. 636 (1934), noted in (1931) 41 YA=: L. J. 130. The statute provides
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assets,17 but it can distrain only against the reversion, which in a ninety-nine year
lease is of negligible value. The problems of liability and collection, however,
should be kept distinct.' 8 The solution lies, not in denying a liability which obvi-
ously should exist, but in strengthening the copection procedure, perhaps by giving
a more liberal judicial construction to the lien statute. 19
that "such lien shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, purchaser or judgment cred-
itor until notice of such lien shall be filed .. ." The court reasoned that, since no such
provision against double liability is afforded a mere contract debtor like the lessee, the
statute does not apply to an ordinary debt. It also held that the statute does not author-
ize garnishment.
17. 43 STAT. 343 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 1580-1581 (1935). Theoretically the gov-
ernment might levy on the rents received by the stockholders, treating them as assets of
the corporation, but such an attempt would have a doubtful fate. See Harwood v.
Eaton, 68 F. (2d) 12, 15 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (Hand, J., concurring). Cf. Sherman, supra
note 13, at 84.
Denial of the lessor's liability, which is unenforceable in any case, does result In the
shareholders' paying normal individual income taxes on the rentals received by them,
which would not be collectible if the payments were considered dividends, for dlvldends
are deductible from an individual's normal tax and included only in his surtax. 48 STAT.
693 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 25 (1935). However, this would obviously result in less
revenue than the collection of the corporate tax plus the individual shareholders' surtaxes.
18. They have been confused by those holding the lessor not liable. See Northwestern
Telegraph Co. v. Tax Comm., 212 Wis. 219, 224, 248 N. W. 164, 166 (1933); West End
Street Ry. Co. v. Malley, 246 Fed. 625, 633 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917) (dissent). But in the
lien and transferee cases the court was careful to base its decisions on procedural grounds,
It assumed that the lessor would be liable for the tax. See notes 14, 16, supra.
19. See note 16, supra. The construction of the lien statute could be extended to
include a contract debtor. See (1931) 41 YAF L. J. 130. If the courts refuse so to con-
strue it, statutory action will be necessary.
